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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided
fifty-seven government contract cases in 1995. In comparison, that
court handed down thirty government contract decisions in 1990,1
twenty-six in 1991,2 thirty-one in 1992,1 forty in 1993,1 and, twenty-
two in 1994.' Forty-seven of the fifty-seven 1995 decisions were
1. Giovanna M. Cinelli, The United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit: Government
Contracts 1990 Summary, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1991).
2. Lynda Troutman O'Sullivan & Martin P. Willard, Government Contracts: 1991 Analysis and
Summary, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 911, 912 (1992).
3. VictorJ. Zupa & BrianJ. Siebel, Government Contracts: 1992 Analysis and Summay, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1993).
4. Richard B. Clifford, Jr. et al., Government Contract Cases Before the Court of Appeas for the
Federal Circuit, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (1994).
5. David R.Johnson et al., A Survey of Government Contract Cases Decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1994, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2115, 2116 (1995).
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appeals from the agency boards of contract appeals;6 eight came from
the Court of Federal Claims;7 one came from the Office of Personnel
Management;' and one, a case involving bankruptcy, came from the
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.9 Well over half
(thirty-two) of the decisions were unpublished." By far, most (thirty-
one) of the appeals from agency boards were from the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals ("ASBCA"), n while four came
6. See infra notes 11-17.
7. Thomas Creek Lumber & Log Co. v. United States, 73 F.3d 379 (unpublished table
decision), No. 95-5080, 1995 WL 710862 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 1995); Fairchild Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 71 F.3d 868 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Central Ark. Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d
1338 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Civ. 1995); Winstar Corp.
v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S.Ct. 2432 (1996); Hamlet v. United
States, 63 F.3d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Minelli v. United States, 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table
decision), No. 95-5018, 1995 WL 424858 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 1995); Henke v. United States, 60
F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
8. See Chertkov v. Office of Personnel Management, 52 F.3d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
9. Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that
Court of Federal Claims had concurrent jurisdiction over government contractor's bankruptcy
proceedings and contract dispute).
10. SeeinfrapartVI.
11. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Dalton, 73 F.3d 380 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-
1272, 1995 WL 730458 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 1995); Sippial Elec. & Constr. Co. v. Widnall, 69 F.3d
555 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-1276, 1995 WL 646344 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 1995); Metric
Constructors v. Goldin, 69 F.3d 554 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1078, 1995 WL 620154
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 1995); Hollfelder Technische Dienste Ingenieurgesellschaft MBH v. West, 69
F.3d 534 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1421, 1995 WL 616601 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 1995),
affg per cutiam ASBCA No. 39888, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,809 (1994); R.B. Enters., Inc. v.
Widnall, 66 F.3d 347 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1053, 1995 WL 550250 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 14, 1995), af/'g per curiam ASBCA No. 45514, 94-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 27,030 (1994);
McDonald Welding & Mach. Co. v. Dalton, 66 F.3d 347 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-
1147,1995 WL 550251 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14,1995), afflgper curiam ASBCA No. 36284, 94-2 B.CA
(CCH) 1 27,181 (1994); Dalton v. Murdock Mach. Eng'g Co., 66 F.3d 344 (unpublished table
decision), No. 95-1121,1995 WL 515222 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30,1995); International Gunnery Range
Servs. Inc. v. Widnall, 64 F.3d 678 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1444, 1995 WL 502895
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 1995); Program & Constr. Management Group, Inc. v. West, 64 F.3d 676
(unpublished table decision), No. 95-1084, 1995 WL 490260 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1995), affigper
curiam ASBCA No. 47048, 95-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,413 (1995); Raven Indus., Inc. v. Kelso, 62
F.3d 1433 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-1374, 1995 WL 453069 (Fed. Cir.July 31, 1995);
Aydin Corp. (West) v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995); M. Bianchi v. Perry, 61 F.3d 920
(unpublished table decision), No. 94-1166,1995 WL 432398 (Fed. Cir.July 21,1995); GTE Gov't
Sys. Corp. v. Perry, 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table decision), No. 91-1424, 1995 WL 424835
(Fed. Cir. July 18, 1995); Interstate Constr. Inc. v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table
decision), No. 94-1506, 1995 WL 424841 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 1995), afjg per curiam ASBCA No.
45696, 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 26,930 (1994); Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Peterson Constr. Co. v. Widnall,
57 F.3d 1085 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1530, 1995 WL 358133 (Fed. Cir.June 12,
1995), af'g per curiam ASBCA Nos. 41132, 41142, 41600, 94-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 26,991 (1994);
Planning & Human Sys., Inc. v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 80 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1448,
1995 WL 298956 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 1995), aff'gpercuriamASBCA No. 44013,94-2 B.CA (CCH)
126,860 (1994); American Contract Servs., Inc. v. Widnall, 53 F.3d 348 (unpublished table
decision), No. 94-1415, 1995 WL 239306 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 1995), affigper curiamASBCA No.
46788, 94-3 B.C-A. (CCH) 1 27,025 (1994); Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Dalton, 53 F.3d 347
(unpublished table decision), No. 94-1449, 1995 WL 225545 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 1995), afl'gper
curiamASBCA Nos. 24578, 25838, 28687, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,687 (1994); Mallory Elec. Co.
v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 839 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1432, 1995 WL 375947 (Fed. Cir.
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from the Corps of Engineers Board ("ENGBCA"), 2 six from the
General Services Board of Contract Appeals ("GSBCA"), 3 two from
the Department of Agriculture Board ("AGBCA"),14 two from the
Department of Housing and Urban Affairs Board ("HUDBCA"),'1
and one each from the Department of Veterans Affairs Board
("VACAB"),16 and the Department of Energy Board ("DOEBCA").17
The court reversed, in whole or in part, fifteen of the fifty-seven
lower-court decisions.
18
This Article presents an analysis of the significant 1995 cases
decided by the Federal Circuit and a summary of unpublished and
less precedentially significant published cases. Part I presents the
Apr. 5,1995); CBI NA-CON, Inc. v. West, 52 F.3d 343 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1393,
1995 WL 133347 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 1995); Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc. v. Widnall, 51 F.3d
258 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Dalton v. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc., 50 F.3d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc. v. Dalton, 50 F.3d 22 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1408,
1995 WL 128422 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 1995), affigpercuriamASBCA No. 43979, 94-2 B.CA (CCH)
26,806 (1994); H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Bill Strong Enters.,
Inc. v. Shannon, 49 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Vinyl Tech., Inc. v. Perry, 48 F.3d 1238
(unpublished table decision), No. 94-1278, 1995 WL 74530 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1995), affg per
curiamASBCA Nos. 43464, 45880, 93-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 25,693 (1993); Perry v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 47 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Grover Enters., Inc. v. Dalton, 47 F.3d 1180 (unpublished
table decision), No. 94-1336, 1995 WL 5614 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 6, 1995), af/'gper curiamASBCA No.
44331, 94-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,139 (1994); LaBarge Prods., Inc. v. West, 46 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
12. Jim Smith Contracting Co. v. West, 61 F.3d 918 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-
1383, 1995 WL 331124 (Fed. Cir.June 2, 1995); Consultores Professionales De Ingeniera, S.A.
v. West, 52 F.3d 345 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1443, 1995 WL 216881 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
12,1995), affigper curiam ENGBCA No. PCC-78, 94-2 B.CA. (CCH) 26,652 (1994); Gulf Coast
Trailing Co. v. West, 48 F.3d 1236 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1347, 1995 WL 51610
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 1995), afflg per curiam ENGBCA No. 5795, 94-2 B.C. (CCH) 1 26,921
(1994); Maitland Bros. v. West, 47 F.3d 1181 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1244, 1995
WL 11193 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11, 1995), afg per curiam ENGBCA No. 5782-R, 94-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
126,473 (1995).
13. TLC Eng'g & Constr. v.Johnson, 70 F.3d 1290 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-
1190, 1995 WL 697310 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 1995), affgper curiam GSBCA No. 11057, 95-1 B.CA.
(CCH) 27,456 (1995); Nortel Fed. Sys., Inc. v. United States Air Force, 77 F.3d 501
(unpublished table decision), No. 95-1213, 1995 WL 723796 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13,1995); PRC, Inc.
v. Widnall, 64 F.3d 644 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Widnall, 70 F.3d 1289
(unpublished table decision), No. 94-1480, 1995 WL 656809 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 1995), revg
GSBCA Nos. 11498-P, 11863-C, 94-3 B.CA (CCH) 27,160 (1994); OAO Corp. v.Johnson, 49
F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Dyncorp v. O'Leary, 47 F.3d 1180 (unpublished table decision), No.
94-1493, 1995 WL 13300 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 4, 1995).
14. White Buffalo Constr., Inc. v. Glickman, 70 F.3d 128 (unpublished table decision), No.
95-1122, 1995 WL 662404 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3,1995), affigpercuiamAGBCANos. 92-199-1,93-113-
1, 94-3 B.CA (CCH) 27,176 (1994); Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
15. Renic Gov't Sys. v. Cisneros, 77 F.3d 501 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1238,
1995 WL 723797 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 1995); Reece v. Cisneros, 60 F.3d 841 (unpublished table
decision), No. 95-1140, 1995 WL 376184 (Fed. Cir. June 8, 1995).
16. Wilson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 60 F.3d 839 (unpublished table decision), No.
95-3236, 1995 WL 258301 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 28, 1995).
17. Beacon Oil Co. v. O'Leary, 71 F.3d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
18. See infra part VI.
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cases in which jurisdiction was the principal issue, including cases
interpreting portions of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978
("CDA"),' 9 the heart of the dispute-resolution process. Part II
discusses three appeals arising from bid protests. Part III examines a
termination case in which the Government's broad discretion to
terminate a contract for convenience was attacked unsuccessfully.
Part IV addresses cases involving cost issues. Part V analyzes an
important sovereign acts case and Part VI summarizes the unpub-
lished decisions and less significant published cases.
I. JURISDICTION
A. When Is a Claim a Claim?
Although there has never been serious dispute that the CDA
requires a "claim" to be in existence before the CDA process may be
invoked,2" the definition of what constitutes a "claim" has, in recent
years, been the subject of more wasteful and confusing government
contract litigation than any other aspect of the CDA.21 As is often
the case when one attempts to describe complicated processes with a
few words, the CDA language is not terribly helpful: "All claims by a
contractor against the Government relating to a contract shall be in
writing and shall be submitted to the Contracting Officer for a
decision."22  The Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), the
pertinent regulatory implementation of the CDA, defines a "claim" as:
[ (1) A] written demand or written assertion by one of the contract-
ing parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in
a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms,
or other relief arising under or relating to the contract... [(2)]
A voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not
in dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may be
converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer... if it is
disputed either as to liability or amount or is not acted upon in a
reasonable time.'
19. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified at 41 U.S.C.
§§ 601-613 (1994)).
20. Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reviewing
jurisdictional scheme of CDA).
21. Congress recently solved another vexing problem involving the certification requirement
of the CDA after the Federal Circuit's decision in United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied 502 U.S. 919 (1991). See4l U.S.C. §§ 605(c) (6)-(7).
22. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a).
23. 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (1995) (emphasis added).
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The recent protracted struggle in the boards of contract appeals
and the courts has been to decide whether the last sentence of FAR
33.201 applies to all requests for payment or just to "vouchers,
invoices, or other routine request[s]."24 The argument has been
shaped by two often competing interests: (1) the CDA's goal to
simplify the disputes process (enabling the contractor to have his day
in court quickly);' and (2) the desire to encourage negotiated
settlements rather than forcing parties into litigation prematurely
(giving the contracting officer enough information and time to
achieve a settlement) .26 The disputes process also has been impact-
ed by a natural tendency on the part of the Government, the
defendant in the cases, to invoke procedural delays whenever
possible,27 and, in recent years, by a lack of funds to finance settle-
ments.8 The process also has been affected by the somewhat less
than inspiring performances by the boards of contract appeals and
the courts in dealing with the competing interests in the context of
the statutory and regulatory language. The result has been torture of
the CDA and the government contract disputes process that was
envisioned by neither Congress, which enacted the ODA with the
intent of simplifying the process of resolving government contract
24. 1&
25. H.R. REP. No. 1556,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5235,
5239.
26. In the cases in which the definition of"claim" became an issue, the Government argued
that the requirement that there be a dispute as a prerequisite to "claim" status is a proper goal
of the CDA because it provides the government contracting officer with the opportunity to
request more information to use in evaluating a request for payment that has been submitted
without creating a claim which necessitates a final decision. Under the CDA, once a submission
is deemed a "claim" it triggers the contracting officer's duty to respond, within 60 days for claims
under $100,000, and within a reasonable amount oftime for claims over that amount. 41 U.S.C.
§ 605(c). The requirement for a dispute would also serve to prevent the contractor from
bypassing the negotiations by withholding information and moving straight into litigation. See
Reflectone Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Bonnum, Inc. v. United States,
33 Fed. Cl. 672, 675 (1995).
27. The debate over the classification of requests for payments as claims or invoices also
would allow the Government to delay the payment of interest on a successful claim, because
under the CDA, interest does not accrue until the date the contracting officer receives the claim.
41 U.S.C. § 611.
28. If a dispute is settled, the settlement funds usually come from the agency's operating
appropriation. Id § 612. On the other hand, if a CDA monetary case is resolved through a
decision of an agency board of contract appeals or by a court, the judgment is paid from the
permanentjudgment appropriation established by 31 U.S.C. § 724a. Section 13(c) requires that
the judgment appropriation be remimbursed "by the agency whose appropriations were used
for the contract out of available funds or by obtaining additional appropriations for such
purposes." 41 U.S.C. § 612(c). Notwithstanding this reimbursement feature, the authors believe
there is at least anecdotal evidence that some, if not many, settlements fail, and cases go to
litigation either because of a lack of funds to pay the settlement or because the agency prefers
to have the claim paid out of something other than its operating appropriation.
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disputes, nor the members of the Commission on Government
Procurement, which provided the framework for the CDA.2 9
The torture of the disputes process began in earnest with the
Federal Circuit's decision in Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States."°
In a fact situation in which liability was admitted and only the
contract amount was at issue, the court attempted to define what
constitutes a CDA claim, holding that in order for the claim to be
valid, the contractor and the agency must "already be in dispute over
the amount requested.""' The court in Dawco also stated that "[t]he
[CDA] and its implementing regulation require that a 'claim' arise
from a request for payment that is 'in dispute."'3 2
The impact of Dawco was immediate, substantial, and detrimental.
The procedural defense that the claim was not in dispute either as to
liability or amount was introduced thereafter by the Government in
hundreds of CDA cases.33  The resulting waste of contractor,
government, and judicial resources expended on sorting out the cases
threatened to reverse any gains made by the CDA in achieving
efficient resolution of disputes. An ASBCAjudge noted that fully one-
half of the cases before the ASBCA in which Dawco's dispute require-
ment was considered resulted in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.'
Fortunately, after a somewhat inelegant process, the Federal Circuit
reversed Dawco in a generally acclaimed decision, Reflectone, Inc. v.
Dalton.s5 The court thereby took a large step toward restoring the
CDA requirements to those originally intended. 6
The Reflectone case began its journey to the Federal Circuit in 1992
when the ASBCA dismissed Reflectone's appeal from a Navy contract-
29. The Commission on Government Procurement, established by Pub. L. No. 91-127,
submitted its report to Congress on December 31, 1972. This report, the result of two years of
study of the procurement system, formed the basis for the CDA. See COMMISSION ON GOV'T
PROCUREMENT, REPORT (1972).
30. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
31. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
32. Id.
33. Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Donald P.
Arnavas, To Claim or Not to Claim, 8 NASH & CIBINIC REPORT 1 63 (1994)).
34. Id.
35. 60 F.3d at 1577 (finding that request for equitable adjustmentwas "claim" under CDA).
36. Four other Federal Circuit decisions were also overruled to the extent that they relied
on Dawco: Bill Strong Enters., Inc. v. Shannon, 49 F.3d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (allowing
contractor's claim for increased compensation due to government delay to constitute "claim"
under CDA); Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (permitting
consolidation of contractor's claim for default termination); Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Garrett, 991
F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that cost letter sent by contractor did not establish
validjurisdiction under CDA); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 485 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (disallowing "claims" because negotiations were continuing between Government and
contractor).
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ing officer's final decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. '7
Reflectone had been awarded a $4,573,559 fixed price contract by the
Navy for updating helicopter weapon system trailers.38 In 1988,
before the trailers were to be delivered, Reflectone advised the
contracting officer that late, unavailable, or defective Government-
furnished property was delaying delivery of certain equipment. 9
The Navy denied responsibility for the delay and issued a cure notice
threatening termination for default4 Between January 1989 and
April 1990, the parties failed to reach agreement on responsibility for
the delay, with the Navy extending the delivery date several times
while reserving the right to make a claim against Reflectone.4'
Reflectone, in turn, continued to maintain that the Navy was
responsible, stating that it would file a claim when the full impact of
such claim was known. On June 1, 1990, Reflectone submitted a
request for equitable adjustment ("REA") to the Navy for $266,840 in
delay-related costs.4' Reflectone's president certified the REA and
requested a final decision from the contracting officer.' On January
15, 1991, the contracting officer denied sixteen of twenty-one items
in Reflectone's claim and estimated the settlement value of remaining
items at $17,662. In addition, the contracting officer told the contrac-
tor that a counterclaim and set-off exceeding the amount requested
by Reflectone was being prepared.' On March 19, 1991, the
contracting officer notified Reflectone that the Navy position of no
liability remained the same and advised Reflectone of its right to
appeal.46
Unfortunately for Reflectone, by this time the ASBCA had the
benefit of the Federal Circuit's decision in Dawco, and, after sixteen
months, the Board ultimately held that it did not have jurisdiction
over the appeal because Reflectone's REA was not a "claim" within the
meaning of the CDA.47 The Board found that "' [a] contractor and
the government contracting agency must already be in dispute over
the amount requested,"' reiterating Dawco's interpretation that "[t]he
[CDA] and its implementing regulation require that a 'claim' arise













from a request for payment that is 'in dispute." '48  The ASBCA
interpreted FAR 33.201 and Dawco as holding that no demand for
payment could be a claim unless the amount of the payment had been
in dispute.49 The ASBCA reasoned that because Reflectone first
requested a specific amount in the REA, no dispute over the amount
existed prior to the REA, and therefore, under Dawco, the REA could
not be a CDA claim.5" The Board stated:
[W]e need not determine whether these issues [presented in the
REA] had previously been submitted to the contracting officer and
were in dispute. Dawco requires that the parties be in dispute over
the amount requested. Clearly in the appeal before us,
[Reflectone] had not quantified the impact of the delays on itself
and communicated it to the government prior to the 1 June 1990
REA. The failure of [Reflectone] to request any amount (and
therefore a dispute could not exist over it) prior to its RFA, renders
[Reflectone's] 1 June 1990 REA incapable of being considered a
claim under the CDA in accordance with the holding of Dawco.51
Reflectone appealed to the Federal Circuit, and on September 1,
1994, a three-judge panel affirmed the ASBCA, accepting its interpre-
tation of Dawco.52 In a split decision, the panel held, as did the
ASBCA, that while liability was clearly in dispute, the amount of the
claim had not been in dispute prior to the June 1 REA.' Interest-
ingly, the author of Dawco, Judge Michel, dissented, stating that "a
pre-existing dispute as to liability, even without a pre-existing dispute
as to amount, is sufficient to make the REA a claim under the
CDA."54  Reflectone filed a petition for rehearing in September
1994, with a suggestion for a rehearing in banc.5" The Federal
Circuit granted Reflectone's petition for rehearing on December 5,
1994, issuing its decision on July 26, 1995.16
The principal issue facing the Federal Circuit in the rehearing was
whether Dawco properly concluded that a CDA claim, as defined in
FAR 33.201, requires a pre-existing dispute between a contractor and
the Government when the claim is in the form of a "written assertion
48. Id. (quoting ASBCA decision (quoting Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d
872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).
49. Id.; see 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (1995).
50. Reectone, 60 F.3d at 1574.
51. 1& (citing Reflectone, ASBCA No. 43081, 93-1 B.C-. (CCH) 25,512, at 127,056
(1992)).
52. Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 34 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994), reh'g in banc granted op.
withdrawn, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34181 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 1994).
53. 1& at 1035-36 (deciding "sum certain" had been reached).
54. Id. at 1039.
55. Ref/ectone, 60 F.3d at 1574.
56. Id.
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... seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum
certain" or other contract relief pursuant to FAR 33.201. s7 In the
alternative, the court considered whether the claim requirement
applied only when the claim initially is in the form of a "routine"
request for payment." Distinguishing between "routine" and "non-
routine" requests for payment, the Federal Circuit held:
We answer the first half of this question in the negative and the
second half in the affirmative. We hold that [the first] sentence of
FAR 33.201 sets forth the only three requirements of a non-routine
"claim" for money: that it be (1) a written demand, (2) seeking, as
a matter of right, (3) the payment of money in a sum certain....
[N]othing in [FAR 33.201] suggests that other written demands
seeking payment of a sum certain as a matter of right, i.e., those
demands that are not "routine request[s] for payment," also must
be already in dispute to constitute a "claim."59
The Reflectone holding is a triumph for common sense and judicial
efficiency.' As the court itself points out, it is illogical to require a
dispute before a demand for payment rightfully due can be a "claim,"
because to have a dispute, the contractor first must make a demand
for payment as a matter of right, i.e., a claim that then is refused."'
The court held that under the FAR language, the critical distinction
in identifying a "claim" is not between disputed and undisputed
submissions, but between routine and non-routine submissions.62 The
former must be converted to a CDA claim if disputed, while the latter
constitutes a CDA claim when first submitted. 63
What, then, is a "non-routine" submission? The answer will be
crafted in the next round of judicial and board decisions. The
Federal Circuit held in Reflectone that an REA clearly is an example of
a non-routine submission because it is a remedy payable only when
"unforeseen or unintended circumstances" cause an increase in
contract performance costs.' "A demand for compensation for
unforeseen or unintended circumstances cannot be characterized as
57. Id. at 1575; see 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (1995).
58. Refectone, 60 F.3d at 1575.
59. IML at 1575-76 (emphasis added).
60. The Court, five days after issuing the decision in Reflectone, remanded another Dawco.
type case back to the ASBCA for consideration on the merits in a unpublished decision. Raven
Indus., Inc. v. Kelso, 62 F.3d 1433 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-1374, 1995 WL 453069
(Fed. Cir. July 31, 1995) (reversing ASBCA decision in accordance with Refectane).
61. Reflectone 60 F.3d at 1576; see 48 C.F.R. § 33.201.
62. Reflectone 60 F.3d at 1577.
63. Id. at 1578.




'routine.'"' The court used as examples Government modification
of the contract, differing site conditions, defective or late-delivered
government property, and issuance of a stop work order.66 Another
important example not mentioned by the court, but that presumably
would be classified equally "unforseen or unintended" as a stop work
order claim, is a claim submitted under a contract Termination for
Convenience clause.67 A closer question would be a request for
price adjustment under an Economic Adjustment clause where one
might argue that increases in price indexes are quite foreseeable.'
Obviously, the consequences of a non-routine request that
constitutes a CDA claim when first submitted goes beyond jurisdiction.
Of particular importance to contractors is the fact that interest will
begin to accrue upon the claim's submission to the contracting
officer.69 On the other hand, Reflectone may render previously
recoverable costs unrecoverable. For example, would costs incurred
in connection with the preparation of a settlement proposal still be
recoverable if that settlement proposal is deemed, under the Reflectone
ruling, to be a CDA claim? The court may have provided an answer
to this question in another case decided in 1995, Bill StrongEnterprises,
Inc. v. Shannan,7° which is discussed below.71 Clearly, however,
issues raised by the Reflectone decision will continue to be litigated for
years to come.
B. Requirement for Claim Documentation
In a decision illustrating the two competing interests in the Dawco
and Reflectone cases, the Federal Circuit ruled that detailed financial
documentation for a CDA claim is not ajurisdictional prerequisite.72
H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton75 involved a contractor who submitted a
certified claim on behalf of a subcontractor that contained a recital
of circumstances that would warrant alleged increased performance
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249 (1995); cf Mayfair Constr. Co. v. United States, 841 F.2d 1576, 1577
(Fed. Cir.) (holding it "beyond cavil" that no claim exists under termination for convenience
clause unless dispute exists), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 980 (1988).
68. 48 C.F.R. § 52.216.
69. The CDA provides that "Eiinterest on amounts found due contractors on claims shall
be paid to the contractor from the date the contracting officer receives the claim ... until
payment thereof." 41 U.S.C. § 611 (1994).
70. 49 F.3d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that CDA claim on merits did not arise
prior to claimed costs).
71. See infra notes 496-523 and accompanying text.
72. H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
73. 49 F.$d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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cost and time.74 Smith, however, ignored repeated requests by the
contracting officer for detailed cost breakdowns and additional
financial information.75 The contracting officer refused to issue a
final decision because he did not consider the claim to be a valid
CDA claim. Smith appealed to the ASBCA under the "deemed
denied" provision of the CDA.76 The ASBCA agreed with the
contracting officer and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
reasoning that without information on how Smith had arrived at the
amount requested, there was no CDA claim.77
In reversing, the Federal Circuit noted, however, that neither the
CDA nor its implementing regulations require the submission of a
detailed cost breakdown or other cost-related documentation with the
claim.7s The court pointed out that there are only three require-
ments in FAR 33.201 for a CDA claim: (1) a demand in writing to
the contracting officer; (2) as a matter of right; and (3) for a sum
certain.79 Smith had met these requirements, making the claims
valid for CDA jurisdictional purposes.0
The competing interests illustrated by H.L. Smith, namely the
contracting officer's interest in getting enough information to arrive
at a correct decision and the contractor's interest in not having claims
unreasonably tied up by contracting officer's endless requests for data,
were also, as previously discussed, concerns in both Dawco and
Reflectone.s' Although H.L. Smith makes clear that a contractor may
get to the board or a court with a bare minimum of information by
meeting the three CDA requirements, that is not usually the advisable
course. 2 The Federal Circuit pointed out that on remand the
ASBCA could either direct the contracting officer to obtain additional
information and stay Smith's claims pending a decision by the
contracting officer, or decide the claims on the existing record."
74. Id.
75. Id at 1564.
76. Id Under the CDA, "[alny fhilure by the contracting officer to issue a decision on a
contract claim within the period required will be deemed to be a decision by the contracting
officer denying the claim and will authorize the commencement of the appeal or suit on the
claim." 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (5) (1994).
77. H.L. Smith, Inc., 94-2 B.CA (CCH) I 26,723, 1994 WL 55629 (1994).
78. H.L. Smith, 49 F.3d at 1564-65.
79. Id. at 1565 (citing Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 960 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denkAe, 506 U.S. 953 (1992)).
80. Id. at 1565-66.
81. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872,878 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Reflectone, Inc.
v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
82. H.L. Smith, 49 F.3d at 1565.
83. Id. at 1566.
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Neither course was likely the procedure Smith wanted. However, as
the court observed:
The CDA envisions cooperation between the contracting officer and
the contractor. It intends to facilitate resolution of contract
disputes by negotiation rather than litigation. Contracting officers
rightly expect cooperation. When Smith failed to respond to the
contracting officer's requests for information and appealed directly
to the Board, Smith simply delayed action on its claims.84
C. When is a Claim Related to a CDA Contract?
The CDA provides that in order for a board of contract appeals to
have jurisdiction, the contractor's appeal must be from a contracting
officer's decision on a claim "relating" to a CDA contract.85 The
Federal Circuit discussed the meaning of this CDA provision in an
unusual 1995 case called LaBarge Products, Inc. v. West.
86
LaBarge submitted the low bid of $38.50 for the base year and
$40.80 for a second option year on an Army procurement for pipe
couplings.8 A second company, Victaulic, submitted the next lowest
bid. 8 Out of concern that the couplings would not be compatible
with pipes being procured separately," the contracting officer
decided to issue an amendment to the solicitation to give the
Government the option of requiring the submission of production
tooling and level-three drawings." The amendment required
another round of bids.91 Before submission of the next round of
bids, another government official impermissibly communicated to
Victaulic that LaBarge had submitted the lowest bid in the initial
round. 2 Although LaBarge did not know about the communication
at the time, the company believed that the Government favored
Victaulic and saw the amendment as a device to avoid awarding the
contract to LaBarge.9 LaBarge's fears of a government bias toward
Victauic apparently were justified, because the day after the request
84. Mt (citations omitted).
85. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1994) (providing that "[a]ll claims by a contractor against the
government relating to a contract shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the contracting
officer for a decision").
86. 46 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
87. LaBarge Prods., Inc. v. West, 46 F.3d 1547, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
88. Id.
89. To ensure that the pipes and couplings would be compatible, the Army originally
intended to award one contract for both. In response to a bidder's complaint, however, the RFP
was amended to allow bidders the option to bid on either the pipe or the couplings alone. Id
90. Id.
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for best and final offers was issued, the Victaulic contract administra-
tor received a telephone call from an unknown person who stated,
"[Y] our competition on the coupling bid... [is] going to bid in the
low 30's this time."94 Notwithstanding this information leak, LaBarge
was again the low bidder with a bid of $32.90 per coupling for the
base and option years; Victaulic bid $32.50, but bid a higher price for
the option years.95 Victaulic then filed a bid protest with the
General Accounting Office ("GAO"), revealing during the course of
that protest the communication from the government official and the
anonymous telephone call regarding the LaBarge bid.96 The bid
protest was denied, and the contract was awarded to LaBarge at its
best and final price.97
Following successful contract performance, LaBarge submitted a
claim to the contracting officer in which it sought to have the
contract reformed to incorporate the earlier, higher best and final
price-a total increase of approximately $800,000.98 LaBarge argued
that it was entitled to reformation of the contract to the higher price
to compensate it for the improper actions of Army personnel.99
LaBarge claimed that but for the improper contract, it would have
been awarded the contract at the original price.
1'0
The contracting officer denied the claim, and LaBarge appealed to
the ASBCA under the CDA. 10 1 The Government moved for dismiss-
al on the grounds that the claim was a bid protest rather than a claim
under the CDA and the ASBCA therefore lacked jurisdiction °12
Once a party submits a bid in response to a request for proposals, an
implied-in-fact contract exists between the Government and that party,
under which the Government is obligated to treat that party's bid
honestly and fairly."0 Citing Coastal Corp. v. United States,' the
Army argued that LaBarge's claim related to the implied-in-fact
contract, not the coupling contract. °  The ASBCA ruled against
the Government on the motion but denied LaBarge's appeal on the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1549-50.






103. Id. at 1551 (citing Coastal Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 728, 730 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that implied-in-fact contract to treat bids honestly and fairly is not contract covered by
CDA)).
104. 713 F.2d 728, 730 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
105. LaBarg, 46 F.3d at 1551.
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merits." 6 LaBarge appealed to the Federal Circuit, and the Govern-
ment again challenged the ASBCA's jurisdiction.
07
Was LaBarge's claim a claim relating to a CDA contract?0 8 The
Government argued that the claim could not relate to the coupling
contract because at the time of the Government's wrongdoing, which
was the basis for LaBarge's claim, the coupling contract had not come
into existence. 9 The Federal Circuit disagreed and distinguished
Coastal Corp. by noting that it involved only the implied-in-fact
contract, whereas LaBarge was an actual holder of a procurement
contract."0 Moreover, the court found that in addition to the
implied-in-fact contract, LaBarge's claim involved violations during the
bidding process of the FAR provisions prohibiting auction tech-
niques.' The court noted that the prohibition of auction tech-
niques was a provision in place for the benefit of contractors and
cited cases that had applied the principle of contract reformation
when a contract had been written in violation of a law or regulation
enacted for the benefit of contractors." The court also held that
in cases where a breach of the law is inherent in the writing of the
contract, reformation is available despite the contractor's initial
adherence to the contract provision later shown to be illegal.'
Finally, the court noted that the claim related to the coupling
contract both as to operative facts and requested relief, in that the
leaking of LaBarge's bid and the allegedly illegal request for best and
final offers could have affected the price of the coupling contract."
4
There could be no doubt, reasoned the court, that a claim based
upon those actions "relates to the coupling contract even though it
also asserts a breach of the implied-in-fact contract to treat bids fairly
106. d2 at 1550.
107. Id-
108. The CDA applies to contracts for the procurement of property. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a)
(1994). That the coupling contract was a contract for the procurement of property was
undisputed. LaBarge, 46 F.3d at 1551 n.1.
109. LaBarge, 46 F.3d at 1551.
110. Id. at 1552 (finding equitable principle of reformation applicable because actual
contract exists).
111. Id The provision in effect at the time was 48 C.F.R. § 15.610(d) (1984). The FAR
states that "'[t]he contracting officer and other Government personnel... shall not engage in
... (8) Auction techniques, such as-(i) Indicating to an offerer a cost or price that it must
meet to obtain further consideration; (ii) Advising an offerer of its price standing relative to
another offerer ... (iii) Otherwise furnishing information about other offerors' prices."'
LaBarge, 46 F.Sd at 1552 n.3 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 15.610(d) (1984)).
112. LaBarge, 46 F.3d at 1552 (citing South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (in banc); Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1988); CRF-
Ajoint Venture, Etc. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1054, 1061-62 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Applied Devices
Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 635, 640-41 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
113. Id. at 1552 (citing Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 426 F.2d 314 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
114. Id. at 1553.
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and honestly." 5 The court also cited the legislative history of the
CDA in support of its holding."6
On the merits, however, the court ruled against LaBarge, finding
that even though the disclosure to Victaulic clearly violated the FAR,
the Government had a legitimate reason for asking for a best and
final offer (concern about compatibility of the couplings and the
pipes); and as LaBarge did not know at the time of the best and final
offer that its price had been disclosed to Victaulic, its final price was
not influenced by the wrongdoing." 7 Under the circumstances,
LaBarge was not entitled to relief.
D. When is a Board Appeal Ready for Appellate Review?
The Federal Circuit addressed the doctrine of finality as it relates
to board decisions in its affirmation of Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc.
v. Widnall."8 Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc. ("OHA"), sought to
recover from the Government: (1) costs and expenses incurred in
responding to a government investigation of safety violations and
fraud, and (2) costs incurred as a result of the contracting officer's
stop work order and his request for a technical review of a
whistleblower's accusations."' OHA initially submitted a claim to
the contracting officer only for the costs incurred as a result of the
stop work order and for performing the technical review.Y°0 This
claim for $10,722 was denied and was not pursued further by
OHA. 12 ' Instead, OHA submitted a new claim to the contracting
officer for $945,310, which included the full amount of the costs
associated with the Government's investigation of the whistleblower's
allegations.1 22 OHA claimed entitlement to recovery of these costs
under the Changes clause of the firm fixed price contract.12 3 The
contracting officer denied OHA's claim in its entirety, and OHA
timely appealed to the ASBCA.
124
Upon the Government's motion for summaryjudgment, the ASBCA
found that the criminal investigation was undertaken as part of the
115. Id
116. Id. at 1553-54 (noting that intent behind "all disputes" clause was to resolve any and all
disputes that arose in connection with government contracts).
117. Id. at 1556. The Army official making the decision to issue the request for best and
final offers was not involved in the leaks of Labarge's prices. Id.
118. 51 F.3d 258, 260-61 (Fed. Cir. 1995).




123. Id at 259-60.
124. I. at 260.
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Government's sovereign law enforcement capacity." The ASBCA
also found that OHA's claim did not support recovery of these costs
under the Changes clause of the contract because it was unclear that
the investigation was instigated by the contracting officer.'26 For
these reasons, the ASBCA granted the Government's motion with
respect to those costs incurred by OHA in responding to the criminal
investigation. 2 7 The Board did not grant the Government's summa-
ry judgment motion with regard to costs incurred in responding to
the contracting officer's stop work order and the required technical
review, both of which might be recoverable under the Changes clause
of the contract.
128
OHA appealed the Board's decision to the Federal Circuit,
129
which addressed two issues. The first issue, raised sua sponte, was the
court's jurisdiction over OHA's appeal."3 The second issue was
whether the ASBCA was correct in its decision that the criminal
investigation was a sovereign act for which OHA was not entitled to
recover costs.'
3 '
The jurisdictional issue raised in Orlando Helicopter was based on
whether the ASBCA's decision was "final" for purposes of permitting
the Federal Circuit to review that decision.13 2 The court comment-
ed on its high regard for the finality doctrine, emphasizing its
reluctance to interfere with the function of administrative law judges
("ALJ") and its concern for avoiding wasteful and time-consuming ap-
peals.
133
The court distinguished the facts in Orlando Helicopter from an
earlier case, Dewey Electronics Corp. v. United States,"M on which the
Government now relied for its argument that the court did not have
jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit reasoned that Dewey involved nine
separate claims, all of which had been considered by the Board,"5
whereas Orlando Helicopter involved only a single claim that had been
125. Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc., ASBCA No. 45778, 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 26,751, at
133,080 (1994).
126. Id. at 133,080.
127. iL
128. Id.
129. Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc. v. Widnall, 51 F.3d 258, 260 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
130. Id
131. Id. at 262.
132. Id. at 260. The jurisdictional issue falls under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10) (1994), which
grantsjurisdiction of appeals under section 8(g) (1) of the CDA to the Court ofAppeals for the
Federal Circuit.
133. Orlando, 51 F.3d at 260.
134. 803 F.2d 650, 653-54 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
135. Dewey Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 650, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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decided through partial summary judgment.16 Unlike in Dewey, the
Board in Orlando Helicopter retained jurisdiction over a part of the
claim at the time of the appeal to the Federal Circuit.
1 7
After rejecting Dewey as dispositive of the issue, the court reverted
to general principles of finality to resolve the issue of whether the
Board's decision was sufficiently final as to that part of the claim
being appealed for the court to have jurisdiction."s In conducting
its analysis, the court compared the effect of reviewing the appeal
before the court at that time to the likely result of waiting until the
remainder of the original appeal before the Board was adjudicat-
ed.'39 In conducting this comparison, the court considered what
impact a decision to review the appeal before it at that time would
have on the remainder of the appeal before the Board, as well as the
inconvenience and cost associated with piecemeal review. 40
In its analysis, the court determined that addressing the
Government's sovereign acts defense at that time would not delay or
otherwise affect the Board's adjudication of the remaining portion of
OHA's claim still before the Board (that portion related to the stop
work order and the requested technical review)."' In the court's
assessment, it would be less costly and more efficient for the court to
address the appeal than to remand the issue to the Board until the
entire claim was resolved. 4 The court also considered that OHA's
costs of responding to the criminal investigation comprised the bulk
of its claim compared to the costs not yet addressed by the Board."'
Given that the Board clearly had decided OHA's rights with respect
to the costs incurred in responding to the criminal investigation, the
court determined that 'Judicial review will not disrupt the orderly
process of adjudication."1" On this finding, the court decided that
136. Orlando, 51 F.3d at 260. Although the Board may have given the impression that two
separate claims were involved in Orlando, in fact only a single claim was involved and the Board's
decision was a partial summary judgment as to certain of the costs included in that one claim.
Id. The Board's partial summary judgment did not apply to that portion of the claim for costs
associated with the stop work order, the request for responses issued with that order, the
technical review, or the documentation/part-remova requirements. Id.










the Board's decision was final under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (10)'" and
that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal before it.1"
After assuming jurisdiction over OHA's appeal, the court addressed
the issue of whether the Board was correct in holding that the
criminal investigation was a sovereign act for which OHA was not
entitled to recover its costs. 47 The court explained that "[a]
sovereign act is public and general in nature, not private and
contractual."'" The determination of whether an act is sovereign
depends on the nature of the conduct, not on who initiated the
act.
149
The conduct at issue in Orlando Helicopter is one of the oldest'examples of sovereignty-exercise of the Government's law enforce-
ment powers.1 50 Neither the fact that the contracting officer had a
role in the conduct at issue, nor the fact that the conduct affected a
government contract, caused the conduct to become a contractual
matter.'51 In Orlando Helicopter, moreover, there was no dispute that
the contracting officer did not initiate or control the investigation,
making it clear that the investigation was not a contractual matter. 5
As a result, OHA was not entitled to recover costs incurred in
response to the Government's investigation under the Changes clause
in the government contract.5 OHA's allegation that the investiga-
tion was overzealous does not alter this result." Accordingly, on
the basis of the Government's sovereign acts defense, the court
affirmed the ASBCA's decision that the Government was entitled to




147. Id. at 262.
148. Id. (citing Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925); Sun Oil Co. v. United
States, 572 F.2d 786, 817 (1978)).
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing SaudiArabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (explaining that it has long been
understood that exercise of police power is indicia of sovereignty); Crow Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 284 F.2d 361, 364 (Ct. Cl. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961)).
151. See id. (stating that whether contracting officer is involved in action or action occurs
during government contract is not dispositive in determining whether sovereign act is
contractual).
152. Id.
153. See id. (explaining that contract contained no express or implied provisions requiring
agreement to pay for criminal investigations).
154. See id. at 262-63 (dismissing contractor's argument that it should recover, in contract,
for alleged overzealous, unprofessional investigation).
155. See id. ("We simply hold that the Board did not err in exercisingjurisdiction over the
contract claim here presented, and correctly concluded that the government is entitled to
summary judgment as to expenses caused by the criminal investigation.").
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E. Concurrent Jurisdiction over CDA Claims in Bankruptcy
In Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States,"56 the Federal Circuit held
that the U.S. district court in which a government contractor's
Chapter 11 estate is pending has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Federal Claims over a government contract claim included
in the bankrupt's estate.'57 This decision was made against the
backdrop of similar litigation in Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States,'
58
decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1983, and United States v. Bagley,
I1 9
decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1993. In both Gary Aircraft and
Bagley, the courts considered whether a district court sitting in
bankruptcy had authority to decide a government contract claim of
a bankrupt government contractor or whether the court was required
to transfer or defer the claim to the ASBCA for decision.
16°
The Fifth Circuit considered five factors and essentially concluded
that it was always appropriate for the district court to defer such a
government contract claim to the .appropriate board of contract
appeals for decision-that is, the district court had virtually no
discretion to defer the claim.'' The factors considered by the court
in Gary Aircraft included: (1) whether resolution of the claims by a
specialized tribunal would impair the requirement that satisfaction of
all claims against the bankrupt estate should proceed in a central
forum; (2) whether technical and esoteric issues relating to govern-
ment contract law are present; (3) whether the tribunals specifically
designated to resolve government contract disputes may fulfill the
needs for expertise, speed, and uniformity in resolving government
contract disputes; (4) whether a contract dispute involving claims
against the Government that falls under the Court of Federal Claims'
exclusive jurisdiction would result in the same contract dispute being
tried twice; and (5) whether Congress has endorsed the transfer of
particular disputes to specialized tribunals. 16 2  The Fifth Circuit
determined that each of these five factors would be present in every
156. 47 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reh'g in banc denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16623 (Fed.
Cir. June 16, 1995).
157. Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
158. 698 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983).
159. 990 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1993).
160. United States v. Bagley, 990 F.2d 567, 568 (10th Cir. 1993); Gary Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 698 F.2d 775, 778 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983).
161. Gary Aircraft, 698 F.2d at 784 (concluding rule rather than discretion by choice is
appropriate). Gay Aircraft involved a pre-CDA contract, and accordingly there was no question
of statutory requirement to defer the claim to a specialized, government contract forum for
decision. Id. at 778 (noting that CDA was not yet in effect).
162. Id. at 783-84.
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government contract claim that might be involved in a bankruptcy
situation.)6
Ten years later, the Tenth Circuit addressed basically the same
issue. In Bagley, the court considered identical factors and reached
the opposite conclusion-that the bankruptcy court was not required
to defer to the opinion of the ASBCA on a dispute between the
Government and a bankrupt government contractor.'l The Tenth
Circuit decided that the five factors were not necessarily present in
every case, and therefore the district court had discretion to decide
when it was appropriate to defer to a specialized forum for deci-
sion 165
Against the backdrop of conflicting case law in its sister circuits,
166
the Federal Circuit was confronted with the jurisdictional dispute in
Quality Tooling.67 The case arose pursuant to an interlocutory
appeal by the Government under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d) (4). 168 Quality
Tooling, Inc. ("Quality"), a bankrupt government contractor, brought
a government contract claim in the Court of Federal Claims'69
pursuant to the Tucker Act7 ° and the CDA.'7 ' While the claim
was pending, Quality filed for Chapter 11 protection 1 2 under the
Bankruptcy Act.'7 Quality subsequently sought to have its claim
transferred from the Court of Federal Claims to the District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama for consolidation with its bankrupt
estate pending there."7 After the claim was transferred to the
district court, the Government moved to have it transferred back to
the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.'
163. Id. at 784.
164. See Bagly, 990 F.2d at 572 ("We believe the bankruptcy court correctly held that it had
discretion to defer or to determine itselfwhether the government had a viable claim against the
bankruptcy estate.").
165. Id
166. Bagly, 990 F.2d at 568; Gary Aircraft 698 F.2d at 778.
167. Quality Tooling, Inc., v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
168. Id at 1573.
169. Quality's claim arose after the United States Army terminated Quality's parts supply
contract for alleged default. Id. Quality contested the Army's default termination arguing that
the Army terminated the contract for the convenience of the Government rather than any
default and that, accordingly, Quality was entitled to money damages. Id at 1571.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
171. 41 U.S.C. § 609 (1994).
172. Quality initially filed for Chapter 11 protection in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1571. Quality then obtained a transfer of its bankrupt
estate to the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama where Quality is located. Id.
173. The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C.).
174. Quality successfully sought this transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452. Quality Tooling,
47 F.3d at 1572.
175. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1571. Section 1631 provides for transfers to state courts when
the federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case. 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
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On motion to the district court, the Government argued that the
court did not have jurisdiction to try the CDA claim and that the
Court of Federal Claims was the proper forum for resolution of the
claim. 71 When the Government's motion failed, it sought review of
this decision by the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(d) (4).177
On appeal, the Government reiterated its argument that the district
court was withoutjurisdiction to try Quality's claim and that the Court
of Federal Claims was the proper forum for resolution of the
dispute. 7 The Government based its position on language in the
Tucker Act, specifically 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2) and 1491 (a) (2),
which makes the Court of Federal Claims the exclusive trial court for
hearing disputes that arise under the CDA.1'79 The majority ac-
knowledged that the Government was correct with regard to what the
Tucker Act purports to do."8 The majority pointed out, however,
that the Bankruptcy Act gives district courts, sitting in bankruptcy,
concurrent jurisdiction over every claim associated with a bankrupt's
estate, including those claims that, by statute, are within another
court's exclusive jurisdiction.181 "'Notwithstanding any Act of Congress
that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district
courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in
or related to cases under title 11." '182 The majority in Quality
Tooling noted that the meaning of the statute's express language is
reinforced by legislative history that explains Congress' intent to
consolidate a debtor's affairs before one court for the purpose of
avoiding protracted litigation over jurisdiction issues that delay
resolution of a debtor's estate." Moreover, the majority noted that
176. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1571.
177. Section 1292(d) (4) establishes the court's exclusivejurisdiction over appeals of motions
to transfer a case from a district court to the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d) (4).
178. Quality Tooling 47 F.3d at 1572. A separate, and also unsuccessful, argument made by
the Government on appeal was that 28 U.S.C. § 1452 did not support the initial transfer of the
claim from the Court of Federal Claims to the district court. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1572.
The Government's position was that the section only permitted transfers from state courts to
bankruptcy courts. Id. It did not authorize transfers from nationwide federal courts, such as
the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims, to a bankruptcy court. Id. The court of appeals
quickly dismissed this argument explaining that neither the language of § 1452 nor its legislative
history indicated Congress' intent to limit the applicability of§ 1452 to transfers of claims from
state courts. Id.
179. Id. at 1572-73.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1573.
182. Id. at 1573 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994)) (emphasis added).
183. Id. (describing unfavorable results arising from division ofjurisdiction in bankruptcy
matters (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-46 (1978), reipinted in 1978
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such an interpretation of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is consis-
tent with the broad powers and authority granted to bankruptcy
courts over debtor's estates1'J For these reasons, the majority held
that there is "little doubt". that the District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, sitting in bankruptcy, and the Court of Federal
Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over the bankrupt's CDA
claim."s
In reaching this conclusion, the majority was forced to consider the
Government's argument that the only waiver of sovereign immunity
for CDA claims is in the Tucker Act," 6 and furthermore, that the
waiver is limited exclusively to the Court of Federal Claims.'87
Writing for the court, Judge Plager rebutted this claim,"S determin-
ing that a waiver of sovereign immunity naturally precedes the grant
of jurisdiction and, therefore, it would be redundant for the Tucker
Act to state expressly that the United States consents to be sued in
any forum with jurisdiction over a CDA claim.'89 According to the
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6006-07)).
184. Id. at 1573. The court elaborated that a district court sitting in bankruptcy has the
power for "'the collection and distribution of the estates of bankrupts and the determination
of controversies thereto .... In such respects, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts is
exclusive of any other courts.'" Id (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939)).
185. I
186. hI at 1574. This waiver is express in the TuckerAct. See28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1) ("The
United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to renderjudgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States....").
187. The Government maintained that "it [was] not enough" for a district court to have an
express statutory grant of jurisdiction; the court also must have an express waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity. Quality Tooling, 47 F3d at 1573-74. The Government
derived its argument from the Supreme Court's opinion in Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1574. In that decision, the Court held
that 28 U.S.C. § 1362, which gives district courts authority to hear claims brought by Indian
tribes, did not abrogate Alaska's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Id. On the
relationship between grants of jurisdiction and waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court in
Blatchford stated that "'[t]he fact that Congress grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice
to show Congress has abrogated all defene to that claim. The issues are wholly distinct."' Id.
(quoting Blatthford, 501 U.S. at 786 n,4). Furthermore, any waiver of sovereign immunity, such
as that in the Tucker Act for CDA claims, must be "strictly construed." Id. (citing Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
310, 318 (1986)).
188. See Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1573-78.
189. i at 1575 ("'It is axiomatic that the United States not be sued without its consent and
that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction."' (quoting United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983))). The majority in Quality Toolingstated that "a court need
not find a separate waiver of sovereign immunity in the substantive provision [of law granting
a right to monetary relief], just as a court need not find consent to suit in 'any express or
implied contract with the United States.' ... The Tucker Act itself provides the necessary
consent." Id. (quoting Mitheli 463 U.S. at 218 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1))).
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majority, no "ritualistic formula" is necessary to establish waiver,'90
"'rather intent to waive immunity and the scope of such a waiver can
only be ascertained by reference to underlying congressional
policy."" 9 1 Relying on language in United States v. Mitchell,92 Keifer
& Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp. '3 and the general practice of
Congress to waive sovereign immunity simultaneously with the
granting of jurisdiction to a forum over claims for monetary re-
lief," the majority concluded that the Tucker Act provides the
necessary consent to be sued on CDA claims to any court with
jurisdiction to hear the claim.
The majority wrote, "The issue here is not whether the Government
has waived its sovereign immunity, but whether that waiver ex-
tends to federal trial fora other than the Court of Federal
Claims."195 While the majority expressed that decisions of the
Supreme Court on this issue must be "honor[ed]," it concluded that
it was more important to follow "Congressional intent and purpose"
on this issue.196  According to this rationale, the majori-
ty rejected arguments by the Government and by the dissent that
relied on United States v. Nordic Village,97  Minnesota v. United
190. Id at 1575 (quoting Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstr. Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381,389 (1939)).
Keifer did not contemplate the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity for particular claims
in a context where exclusive jurisdiction was established by statute for those claims. Keifer, 306
U.S. at 387-89 (explaining that Congress did not even mention governmental immunity in
legislation in question).
191. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1575 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. United States
Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 521 (1984)).
192. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
193. 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
194. The majority relies heavily on a general pattern of congressional action waiving
sovereign immunity when it grants the right to sue the Government for monetary relief. See
Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1577-78 (citing to Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994)
(waiving, through general legislation, governmental immunity for torts committed by its agents);
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994) (eliminating governmental immunity
from money claims resulting from government contracts); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and LiabilityAct of 1980,42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (B) (1994) (allowing
suits against Government for certain environmental compliance costs)).
195. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1576.
196. See id. at 1577 (favoring congressional intent over contrary Supreme Court decisions).
197. Id. at 1576, 1581-85. The Government relied on United States v. Nordic Village, 503
U.S. 30, 34-36 (1992), to argue that, for purposes of determining congressional intent regarding
consent to suit, the specific waivers of sovereign immunity included in the Bankruptcy Act were
relevant, not the broad waivers in the Tucker Act. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1575-76. Because
none of the three Bankruptcy Act waivers was applicable to Quality's CDA claim, the
Government concluded that there was no consent by the Government to be sued on the claim.
Id. at 1576. Nordic Village involved the issue of whether a bankruptcy trustee had a substantive
right to payment in the first instance based on possible waiver of sovereign immunity under
§ 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 31. It did not address the issue of
whether the waiver extended beyond the COFC to federal trial courts. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d
at 1576. On the basis of this distinction, the majority concluded that the Government's reliance
on Nordic Village was misplaced. Id.
1680
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CASES
States,9' and United States v. Shaw."9  The majority's articulation
that Supreme Court case law was less significant than expressions of
congressional intent on this issue 2° is difficult to reconcile with the
majority's tremendous reliance on Mitchell and Keifer to support its
opinion.201 Even more perplexing is the majority's primary reliance
on Congress' general pattern of concurrently waiving sovereign
immunity and granting jurisdiction to a court to recover monetary
relief from the Government.
20 2
The majority pointed only to one concrete indication of congressio-
nal intent on this issue to support its opinion that Congress had not
indicated a preference for one forum over the other.203 Language
in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ("FASA7)
20 4
amended the CDA to include a provision permitting a district court
to request opinions from a board of contract appeals on matters of
contract interpretation relevant to CDA claims pending before that
court2  According to the majority in Quality Tooling, this provision
clearly contemplates that in some instances, district courts sitting in
bankruptcy, such as the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, properly would have CDA claims before them for resolution
on the merits. 2 6 Therefore, according to the majority view, Con-
gress believed it already had waived sovereign immunity to permit
such claims to be heard by those courts.0 7
Notably, in its analysis, the majority did not consider the limiting
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) that provides, "[T]he district
courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against
the United States founded upon any express or implied contract with
the United States ... which [is] subject to sections 8(g) (1) and
10(a) (1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. "20s
Presumably in response to anticipated criticism of its decision, the
majority expressly limited its holding to the specific facts involved in
198. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1576-77, 1581-85 (citing Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S.
382, 388-90 (1939)).
199. 1& (citing United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940)).
200. See id. at 1576-77 (distinguishing Supreme Court case law).
201. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (analyzing majority opinion).
202. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing Bankruptcy Act's concurrent
jurisdiction provision).
203. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1576.
204. Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 2354, 108 Stat. 3243, 3323 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 609(0).
205. FederalAcquisition StreamnliningAct of 1994 ("FASA7), Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 2354,108
Stat. 3243, 3323 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 609(f)).
206. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1578.
207. IA
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1994).
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Quality Tooling.20 9  That is, its holding extends only to "'civil pro-
ceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under
title 11.,,' 21° It does not apply to takings cases, military pay claims,
or other types of entitlement claims that parties may seek to have
transferred from the Court of Federal Claims to a district court. It
applies only to CDA claims that are before a district court sitting in
bankruptcy.
211
Judge Plager added one further qualification to the majority's
holding: before the district court may adjudicate a CDA claim, it
must consider whether, as a matter of judicial economy and pru-
dence, the cause should be heard by it or the Court of Federal
Claims. 2  In addressing this practical concern, the majority again
considered the conflicting opinions of the Fifth Circuit in Gary
Aircraft 1 and the Tenth Circuit in Bagley.214 The majority chose
to follow the rule enunciated by the Tenth Circuit, that the bankrupt-
cy court has discretion to defer a claim to a specialized government
contract forum or to adjudicate the claim itself.2 5 The outcome is
reviewable for abuse of the court's discretion.216 The majority made
this decision for the purpose of maintaining some flexibility on the
issue, yet makes very clear that in many instances the prudential
decision of the district court sitting in bankruptcy will be to "defer a
complicated, technical dispute to a specialized forum," as in Gary
Aircraft.217 When a government contract claim is relatively straight-
forward, then, in the interest ofjudicial economy, it may be appropri-
ate for the bankruptcy court to adjudicate the claim itself or to seek
209. See Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1578 (responding to dissent's arguments by stating that
opinion is limited to specific jurisdiction question raised by Quality).
210. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
211. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of holding in
Quality Tooling).
212. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1578.
213. 698 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983).
214. United States v. Bagley (In re Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co.), 990 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.
1993). For a discussion of these two cases, see supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
215. Bagley, 990 F.2d 567,572 (10th Cir. 1993). The decisions in Gay Aircraft and Bagley are
not as different as they may appear superficially. They both consider the factors itemized in the
text accompanying supra note 165. In Gary Aircraft, the Fifth Circuit simply took a more
conservative view and believed that as a general rule the bankruptcy court was required to transfer
a "complicated, technical dispute to a specialized forum." Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1579
(quoting Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 698 F.2d 775, 783 (5th Cir. 1983)). In Bagley, the
Tenth Circuit took a more flexible approach, however, and decided that the court was to look
at the facts in each case against the enunciated factors before determining whether the transfer
to a specialized forum was appropriate. Bagley, 990 F.2d at 572.
216. See Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1580 (holding that district court's discretion in deciding
whether deferral is appropriate is reviewable for abuse).
217. Id. (quoting Gary Aircraft, 698 F.2d at 783).
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an advisory opinion from a board of contract appeals, in lieu of a
transfer of the claim to the Court of Federal Claims. 18
The Quality Tooling decision was not free from controversy, least of
all from the court's own members. Judge Schall vehemently dissented
from the majority's decision in a well-reasoned opinion.21 9  His
dissent relied on the principles set forth in Nordic Village220 and
elsewhere221 that "the Government's consent to be sued must be
construed strictly in favor of the sovereign ... and not enlarge[d]...
beyond what the language [of the statute] requires."222 On this
basis, Judge Schall asserted that the waiver of sovereign immunity in
the Tucker Act is forum specific.2" Judge Schall bolstered his strict
construction argument with reference to the Supreme Court decisions
in Minnesota224 and Shaw2 that addressed the Government's con-
sent to be sued.226 In Minnesota, the Supreme Court stated, "It rests
with Congress to determine not only whether the United States may
be sued, but in what courts the suit may be brought."
227
Applying the law enunciated by the Supreme Court, which requires
a congressional expression of waiver of sovereign immunity for each
specific forum,228 the dissent opined that the district court, sitting
in bankruptcy, did not have jurisdiction to hear Quality's claim.
229
The reasoning for the dissent's opinion is that section 106 of the
Bankruptcy Act?' as amended most recently in 1994,2  provides
for only three specific waivers of sovereign immunity for district courts
sitting in bankruptcy and none of those are applicable to a
"contractor's CDA claim when the government has not asserted a
218. Id; see supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (discussing FASA and encouraging
district courts' use of advisory opinions).
219. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1581 (Schall, J., dissenting).
220. 503 U.S. 30, 32-36 (1992).
221. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991) (understanding waivers of sovereign
immunity must be narrowly construed in favor of the United States).
222. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1581 (Schall,J., dissenting) (quoting Nordic Village, 503 U.S.
at 32-36) (citations omitted)).
223. See id. (Schall,J., dissenting) (concluding that Tucker Act's waiver was not sufficient to
give district court jurisdiction over Quality's claim).
224. 305 U.S. 382 (1939) (determining that Congress alone confers jurisdiction).
225. 309 U.S. 495 (1940) (explaining that court does not have authority to extend waiver of
immunity beyond Congress' intent).
226. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1581-82 (Schall,J., dissenting).
227. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388 (1939).
228. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1583 (Schall, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 1581-83 (Schall,J., dissenting) (concluding that Government's consent to be
sued through legislation must be strictly construed).
230. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
231. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 106).
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claim in the bankruptcy proceeding."" 2 Judge Schall placed great
emphasis on the fact that § 106 was revised as recently as 1994, and
that if Congress thought that the Government's waiver of sovereign
immunity should extend to CDA claims before the bankruptcy court,
then Congress would have so stated in § 106.2"8
It is unlikely that the Federal Circuit's decision in Quality Tooling
will be the last word on this issue. At a minimum, expect to see some
further action in proposed procurement reform legislation.
F Contract Implied-in-Fact or Law
In Gould, Inc. v. United States,2" the Federal Circuit once again
addressed the distinction between dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."5 The court previously addressed this issue in Do-Well
Machine Shop Inc. v. United States,2 8 in which it stated:
The distinction between lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, is an important one:
"[T]he court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the
allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant
relief as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controver-
sy.
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated.., by the possibility that
the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which
petitioners could actually recover.
'2 37
The Federal Circuit clearly was exasperated in its most recent
decision in the decade-long Gould case.2" Gould involved a 1983
Navy solicitation of bids for the construction of a radio in accordance
with Navy-provided performance specifications." 9 In its initial bid
price, Gould assumed that it could build the Navy radio by modifying
a similar Army radio design that had been provided "for informational
purposes only" with the Navy request for proposal.24
232. Quality Tooling, 47 F.3d at 1583 (Schall, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 1583-84 (Schall, J., dissenting) (stating that when Congress enacts new
legislation, it presumably knows current, pertinent law).
234. 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
235. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Gould V].
236. 870 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
237. Do-Well Mach. Shop Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637, 639-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
238. See Gould I, 67 F.3d at 931 ("[T]his matter is approaching its tenth anniversary and
Gould has yet to get its first hearing on the merits. Justice delayed is indeed justice denied.").
239. Id. at 927. The Naval Electronics System Command solicited bids for a fixed-price, five-





After being awarded the contract, Gould claimed to have expended
$57 million in unanticipated design costs because it had to redesign
completely the Army radio to meet the Navy's allegedly enhanced
performance specifications. 41 The Navy allegedly withheld request-
ed information from Gould during the procurement process that
would have indicated that upgrading the Army radio design would not
be sufficient to meet the Navy's performance specifications." On
December 11, 1986, Gould submitted a claim to the Navy for
"equitable reformation" of the contract to recover its increased design
costs.2 43 The Navy contracting officer denied the claim and Gould
appealed the decision to the Claims Court pursuant to 41 U.S.C.
§ 609(a) (1).21
The Government moved to dismiss Gould's appeal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Claims Court
granted the Government's motion on January 16, 1990, under Rule
12(b) (4) of the Rules of the United States Claims Court.246 In this
decision (GouldI), the Claims Court considered Gould's claim to be
one for contract reformation.24 The court did not believe that
Gould had stated a basis upon which relief could be granted in any
of the three counts it alleged in its complaint.4 Gould had alleged
that (1) the Navy violated 10 U.S.C. § 2306(h) (1) (D) by failing to
supply a "stable design" for the contract, thereby making the contract
illegal;249 (2) the Navy "improperly withheld" information from
bidders that would have informed them of the extent of the design
effort and risk associated with performance;250 and (3) there was
mutual mistake relating to the amount of design work required by the
contract
251
241. See id. (noting that Gould contended that he believed that only modifications to existing
Army radio were necessary to satisfy Navy enhanced performance requirement).
242. Id.
243. See id. (noting that Gould submitted claim for "equitable reformation and upward
adjustment in the price of the contract," which included more than $57 million in added costs).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing Gould, Inc. v. United States, 19 CL. Ct. 257 (1990)).
247. Id. at 927-28 (noting that Claims Court concluded that it had jurisdiction because
contract reformation is equitable remedy for which money judgment may be granted).
248. Id at 928.
249. Id. at 927 n.2 (noting 10 U.S.C. § 2306(h) (1) (D) (1994) requires that, for items and
services associated with weapons systems and their logistical support, "there be a stable design
for the property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with such property are
not excessive").
250. Id at 927.
251. Id
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In Gould 1, the Federal Circuit vacated the Claims Court's decision
in Gould I and remanded the case for trial.252 In that decision, the
Federal Circuit held that Gould had not limited its claim to one for
contract reformation and that Gould's complaint included sufficient
facts upon which relief could be granted.25
On remand, the Government filed a motion to dismiss Gould's
complaint for lack of jurisdiction." In Gould 1/, the renamed
Court of Federal Claims255 granted the Government's motion.256
The court reasoned that because Gould's complaint was based solely
on a contract with the United States that Gould asserted was illegal
(because the contracting officer was without authority to enter into a
contract for a design that was not stable), the only possible basis for
jurisdiction was a contract implied-in-law 7 Implied-in-law contracts
are not within the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction.
258
Gould I7 further held that Gould's claim was barred by a subse-
quent Supreme Court decision,259 Office of Personnel Management v.
Richmond,2 ° which was controlling authority conflicting with the law
of the case in Gould f. 26' As Gould 11 did not address the issues
before the trial court on remand, its holding was not binding.
62
Gould appealed the court's dismissal in Gould Hl to the Federal
Circuit, arguing that the court had jurisdiction over its claim pursuant
to the Tucker Act.21 Gould relied exclusively on its contract with
the Government as the basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims.2' The Government argued that because the contracting
252. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Gould
Jll.
253. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 928.
254. Id. at 929.
255. The Claims Court was renamed the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Federal
Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (effective
Oct. 29, 1992).
256. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 758, 764 (1993) [hereinafter Gould III].
257. Gould I, 67 F.3d at 928.
258. Id. (quoting Gould HI, 29 Fed. CL. at 758, 761) (footnotes omitted).
259. Gould/I, 29 Fed. Cl. at 763.
260. 495 U.S. 414 (1990).
261. Gould I, 29 Fed. Cl. at 763 (citing Office of Personnel Managementv. Richmond, 495
U.S. 414, 434 (1990), for proposition that money payments from Federal Treasury are limited
to those authorized by statute, and that benefits claimant may not estop Government due to
misinformation of government employee).
262. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 928.
263. Id. The Tucker Act establishes jurisdiction only for actions "'founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages
in cases not sounding in tort.'" I. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994)).
264. Id. at 928-29.
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officer entered into the contract without appropriate authority, the
contract was illegal.
265
The threshold issue in the court's decision on appeal was whether
Gould stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, not whether
the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction.2' The court ex-
plained the fallacy in the Government's argument that the Court of
Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over Gould's claim.267 First, the
court held that the Government ignored precedent, stating that only
if a contract is plainly illegal does jurisdiction not exist.2ta To be
plainly illegal, such thatjurisdiction does not exist, the illegality in the
award must be "plain on the face of the statute and the regula-
tions. 269 Because the Navy's contract with Gould was not plainly
illegal, the Court of Federal Claims was required to take jurisdiction
over the contract claim in the first instance and to resolve the factual
issue of the contract's legality.
27 °
The court next considered that Gould also could have alleged that
an implied-in-fact contract existed with the Government under which
the company would be entitled to recover compensation for the work
performed. If the contractor confers a benefit on the Govern-
ment in the course of performing a contract that subsequently is
declared invalid, an implied-in-fact contract may be deemed to
exist.272  To determine if facts exist to show an implied-in-fact
contract upon which recovery could be based, the Court of Federal
Claims would have to assume jurisdiction.273
The court further stated that the Supreme Court decision in
Richmond relied upon by the Government was irrelevant to Gould. 74
The decision in Richmond was premised on a statutory entitlement to
certain disability benefits.275 In contrast to Richmond, Gould's claim
265. Id.
266. Id at 929.
267. Id (differentiatingjurisdictional argument that court lacks power to hear subject matter
of dispute from failure to state claim argument that Gould's allegations are insufficient to entitle
Gould to rectify).
268. I& (citingJohn Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cer.
denAe, 377 U.S. 931 (1964)).
269. 1& (citing CACI, Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
270. Id at 930 (holding that illegality in case "turns on questions of fact and the terms of
the contract in dispute and, therefore, there is no plain illegality").
271. i& (holding that even if court found that no express contract existed, Gould's
complaint, interpreted in manner most favorable to Gould, alleges implied-in-fact contract).
272. Id. (citing United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
273. I&
274. Id.
275. I&; see Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 495 U.S. 414, 434 (1990)
(observing statutory origin of claim).
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was based on a contractual entitlement 7 6  The Government's
argument "stretch [ed] Richmond totally out of context" and the court
paid little attention to it.2 77 After making clear that the issue in this
appeal was not jurisdiction, but whether Gould stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted,278 the Court asked what circum-
stances existed to permit the Court of Federal Claims to avoid
following the "law of the case" that the Federal Circuit articulated in
Gould .279 In Gould II the Federal Circuit concluded that Gould
had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted."' "The law
of the case is ajudicially created doctrine, the purposes of which are
to prevent the relitigation of issues that have been decided and to
ensure that trial courts follow the decision of appellate courts."2 ''
Under the "law of the case" doctrine, a court must adhere to a
decision in a prior appeal in the same case unless one or more of the
following exceptional circumstances exist:
(1) the evidence in a subsequent trial is substantially different;
(2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the
law applicable to the issues; or
(3) the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice.
2
In the court's opinion, the Government did not establish the
existence of any of these three exceptional circumstances. a28  The
Court of Federal Claims was bound, therefore, to follow the law of the
case on the issue of whether Gould had stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted,2a the answer to which was established in
Gould .2s In a clearly exasperated tone, the court vacated the
decision of the Court of Federal Claims and remanded the case for
a speedy trial.286




280. Gould II, 935 F.2d 1271, 1275-76 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
281. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 930 (citingJamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 839 F.2d 1544,
1550 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988), overruled on othergrounds byA.C. Aukerman Co.
v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
282. Id. (citing Gindes v. United States, 740 F.2d 947, 950 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1074 (1984)).
283. Id. at 931.
284. Id.
285. Gould II, 935 F.2d 1271, 1275-76 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that Gould's complaint was
sufficient to support claims of superior knowledge, mutual mistake and Navy's failure to supply
a stable design).
286. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 931 (finding that legal proceedings were now in tenth year and
because no hearing on merits had yet occurred, Gould was being denied justice).
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G. Non-CDA Transportation Services Contract
The CDA applies to contracts entered into by an executive agency
for "(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in
being; (2) the procurement of services; (3) the procurement of
construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of real property; or
(4) the disposal of personal property."
287
Presumably, "procurement of services" would include transportation
services, but as the Federal Circuit decided in 1995, the provision does
not encompass all transportation services.a In Dalton v. Sherwood
Van Lines, Inc.,289 the court overruled the ASBCA, holding that a
contract for the provision of transportation services to the Govern-
ment by a common carrier pursuant to a government bill of lading
("GBL") 29 was not subject to the CDA and the ASBCA, therefore,
had no jurisdiction over the claim. 9t
Sherwood Van Lines ("Sherwood") provided transportation of
household goods for uniformed members of the Navy292 pursuant
to a GBL.293 A GBL serves as the contract between the Government
and a common carrier for acquiring freight transportation services
and establishes the parties' respective rights with regard to the services
procured and provided.29
Following moving services that Sherwood provided and for which
it received payment, service members filed claims against the Navy
alleging damage to their property during transport.295  The Navy
paid the claims and sought reimbursement from Sherwood.296
Sherwood refused to pay and the Navy set off the damage amounts
against other money due Sherwood." 7 Sherwood then filed an
appeal on each of the claims with the ASBCA.298
The Government moved to dismiss the appeals on the grounds that
the CDA did not apply to disputes arising from the provision of
transportation services pursuant to GBLs and consequently, ASBCA
287. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
288. Dalton v. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc., 50 F.3d 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
289. 50 F.3d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
290. A GBL is a document the Government uses to acquire freight transportation services
from common carriers.
291. Dalton, 50 F.3d at 1017.
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lacked jurisdiction to hear these disputes." The Board ruled
against the Government and in favor of Sherwood on the merits,
holding that a "GBL contains all the terms necessary to be a [CDA]
contract." "s
The court overruled the ASBCA, finding that the Transportation
Act of 1940"1 authorizes common carriers regulated by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to provide transportation services to
agencies of the federal government at or below their published tariff
rates. 0 2 In passing the Transportation Act, Congress set up a system
to pay carriers for providing those services and a mechanism to
resolve disputes arising out of those transactions.3 13 Although recog-
nizing that the GBLs provided for the procurement of services, the court
held that because the review procedures under the Transportation Act
were different in several respects from the CDA procedures, the two
could not be regarded as complementary."° Providing a detailed
analysis of the differences between the CDA and the Transportation
Act procedures, the court held:
When the [CDA] applies, it provides the exclusive mechanism for
disputes resolution; the [CDA] was not designed to serve as an
alternative administrative remedy ....
[I]f the [CDA] applies to GBL-based transportation services,
the procedures established by [the Transportation Act and
implementing regulations] do not.




801. 49 U.S.C. § 10721 (1994).
302. Dalton, 50 F.3d at 1016 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10721).
303. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3726(a), (b), (g)(1) (1994)).
304. Id. at 1017. The CDA requires initial action on a claim by an agency contracting officer.
41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1994). The Transportation Act, however, requires that a claim be submitted
either to the GSA or to the agency from whose actions the claim arose. 31 U.S.C. § 3726(a).
305. Dalton, 50 F.3d at 1017-18. The court was careful to limit its decision to GBL-based
transactions. It did not address procurement of transportation services obtained through other
means. See id. at 1020 (differentiating non-GBL procurement on basis that in such instances
GBL does not constitute contract itself, but merely constitutes means by which agency procures




The Federal Circuit considered its first debarment case under the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program ("FEHBP") 1 6 in
Chertkov v. Office of Personnel Management. °7
The appellant, Lynn S. Chertkov, was a clinical social worker."St
Through a private practice, she provided social services to federal
employees and their dependents who were beneficiaries under the
FEHBP. ° She also provided those services to Medicaid beneficia-
ries."'° In 1991, Chertkov was prosecuted by the State of Maryland
for misdemeanor Medicaid fraud.31  She subsequently pled
guilty
3 12
As a result of her guilty plea, the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") notified Chertkov on August 14, 1992, that
she was debarred or excluded from participating in any program
under the Social Security Act,"' including Medicaid, for a period of
ten years and advised her of her rights to the review of the decision
by an ALJ.114 Chertkov sought a hearing before an ALJ but did not
seek a review of the HHS decision in federal court.3 15 The right to
review of an HHS debarment or exclusion decision in federal court
is provided by statute. 16
Out of respect for HHS's debarment decision, on May 18, 1993, the
Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), which manages the
FEHBP, extended Chertkov's exclusion from government contracting
to the FEHBP.311 OPM based its debarment of Chertkov on its
regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 970.100 (a), which provides that "[d] ebarment
306. Congress enacted the FEHBP to provide medical benefits, insurance, or both for various
classes of federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8903-8904 (1994).
307. 52 F.3d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
308. See Chertkov v. Office of Personnel Management, 52 F.3d 961, 964 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(noting that Chertkov practiced for 19 years rendering services to abused and neglected children
and dysfunctional families).
309. Id.




314. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(f), 7a(c) (2) (1994), which requires notice and hearing
for party excluded by HHS from participating in programs under Social Security Act).
315. Id. at 966.
316. If the exclusion is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7, the individual is entitled to review
in the appropriate United States district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f) (1). If the
exclusion is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a, subsection (e) provides for review of HHS's decision
in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the individual resides or in which
the provider's conduct occurred.
317. Chertkov, 52 F.3d at 965-66. This exclusion was done through a notice of proposed
debarment. Id. at 966.
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or suspension of a participant in a program by one agency shall have
government wide effect."31 This regulation, implemented pursuant
to Executive Order 12,549,319 went into effect only the day before
OPM sent the notice to Chertkov.
3 21
OPM finalized its debarment decision on June 30, 1993.
Chertkov appealed OPM's debarment decision to the Federal Circuit
pursuant to the right of appeal provided in 5 U.S.C.
§ 8902a(g) (2).3 OPM argued that the Federal Circuit did not have
jurisdiction pursuant to this section to hear Chertkov's appeal.323
Section 8902a(g) (2) was enacted on November 14, 1988, as part of
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Amendments Act of 1988
("FEHBA") for the purpose of protecting FEHBP beneficiaries from
medical providers deemed unfit or found to have committed fraud or
financial misconduct. 24 The FEHBA provides for debarment of
such providers and includes certain procedural protections for
providers against inappropriate- or improper debarment actions,
specifically, judicial review in the Federal Circuit of final debarment
decisions." FEHBA does not include collateral debarment 26 as
one of the grounds for debarment for which it provides a right of
judicial review.
Section 8902a(g) (2) provides: "[A]ny person adversely affected by
afinal decision under [5 U.S.C. § 8902a(g)(1)] may obtain review of such
318. 5 G.F.R. § 970.100(a) (1995). The history behind OPM's implementation of this
regulation is significant. Executive Order 12,549, issued on February 18, 1986, by President
Reagan, ordered that "[diebarment or suspension of a participant in a program by one agency
shall have government-wide effect." Id. This Order was part of a broader initiative by President
Reagan to curb fraud, waste, and abuse in federal programs. The purpose of this specific
provision was to avoid the need for duplicative debarment proceedings by the various federal
agencies on the same set of facts. Id.
Pursuant to the Executive Order, the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") issued a
common rule" on debarments, which was basically a generic debarment rule that the various
executive departments and agencies could tailor or incorporate as is into their own regulations.
52 Fed. Reg. 20,360 (1987). This common rule included provisions relating to original
debarment decisions and collateral debarments. Twenty-eight agencies, including HHS, adopted
the common rule, in some form, on May 26, 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 19,160 (1988).
OPM eventually adopted the common debarment rule as required by the Executive Order in
1993. 58 Fed. Reg. 28,759 (1993) (codified at 5 C.F.R. § 970 (1996)).
319. 58 Fed. Reg. 28,759 (codified at 5 C.F.R. § 970).
320. Id.
321. Chertkov, 52 F.3d at 966.
322. Id.
323. See id. (agreeing with Government's lack of jurisdiction argument and holding that
Congress had not conferred jurisdiction to hear case).
324. Federal Employee Health Benefits Amendments Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8902a, 8905a,
8906a (1994).
325. Id. § 8902a(g)(2).
326. A collateral debarment is when an agency extends another agency's debarment
determination to its own agency without making its own initial findings to support the
debarment. Chertkov, 52 F.3d at 966.
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decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit."327 A "final decision" is a "determination under [5 U.S.C.
§ 8902(b) or (c)] adverse to a provider of health care services or
supplies."3 28  Sections 8902(b) and (c) do not include collateral
debarment actions; they include only debarment actions originated by
OPM.
Once again, as in Dalton v. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc.,129 the Federal
Circuit refused to expand the scope of its jurisdiction beyond that
expressly provided for by statute.30 Because OPM's debarment of
Chertkov was based on authority other than FE-BA and was not
expressly within the scope of debarments covered by § 8902a(g) (2),
the Federal Circuit refused to take jurisdiction over Chertkov's
appeal.33 ' The court interpreted this to be Congress' intent from
the language of the statute and subsequent Appropriations Acts. 32
It was clear to the court that the grant of jurisdiction under
§ 8902a(g) (2) is reserved for debarment decisions that an agency
originates, despite the harshness this interpretation might have on
individual providers such as Chertkov.3
II. BID PROTEST DECISIONS
The number of precedential bid protest cases decided by the
Federal Circuit in 1995 numbered only three,"M compared to five
in 1994.'a5 Only one case, OAO Corp. v. Johnson,"3 6 involved a
jurisdictional issue. 37 In OAO the court further restricted the
327. 5 U.S.C. § 8902a(g) (2) (requiring individual to be adversely affected by final decision)
(emphasis added).
328. Id § 8902a(g) (1).
329. 50 F.3d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
330. Chertkov, 52 F.3d at 966.
331. Id. at 967.
332. i& In determining Congress' intent on this issue, the court considered language in the
1993 Appropriations Act that forbids any payment from the Employees Health Benefit Fund (the
fund holding contributions from employees and the Government for payment for health services
under the FEHBP) to a health care provider excluded from participation under the Social
Security Act. Id.; see also Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1755 (1992). This language
basically mandated that OPM give collateral effect to HHS debarments. The court further relied
on language in the 1994 and 1995 Appropriations Acts. Chertkov, 52 F.3d at 967 & n.12.
333. Chertkov, 52 F.3d at 966-67.
334. See OAO Corp. v..Johnson, 49 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1995); PRC, Inc. v. Widnall, 64
F.3d 644, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Central Ark. Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1338,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
335. Cleveland Telecommunications Corp. v. Goldin, 43 F.3d 655, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 646 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Parcel 49C Ltd. Partnership v. United
States, 31 F.3d 1147, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994); SterlingFed. Sys., Inc. v. Goldin, 16 F.3d 1177, 1188
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d 1044, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
336. 49 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
337. OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 723 (discussing whether Brooks Act authorizes reverse protests
under jurisdiction of GSBCA).
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jurisdiction of the GSBCA by holding that the Brooks Act does
not authorize reverse protests.5 9  In PRQ, Inc. v. Widnalll ° the
court continued its trend of expanding the costs that a successful
protestor can recoverM41 The third bid protest decision, Central
Arkansas Maintenance, Inc. v. United States,' considered the scope of
the Court of Federal Claims' power to grant injunctive relief to disap-
pointed bidders.m
A. Reverse Protests Not Authorized by Brooks Act
In OAO Corp. v. Johnson, the Federal Circuit once again reversed the
GSBCA on the issue of its jurisdiction over bid protest cases.4 GSA
awarded a contract for computer services to OAO on June 1,
1993.1' Disappointed bidders protested the award decision, arguing
that GSA had violated the Competition in Contracting Act of
19841 by mishandling pricing negotiations and that OAO was
ineligible for the award because it had violated the "key personnel"
requirement of the solicitation by not having senior personnel
available for assignment on the award date.' 7
On June 25, 1993, GSA terminated the contract with OAO
for convenience as part of a settlement with the protesters.'
GSA and the protesters then filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal
with the GSBCA in which GSA agreed that it had mishandled
the price negotiations.349 OAO objected to the Stipulation and
filed a "reverse protest"s5 ° with the Board under the Brooks
338. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1994).
339. Id. (holding that, absent explicit statutory language to effect that Brooks Act should be
applied retroactively to reverse protests, retroactivity does not apply and GSBCA therefore does
not have jurisdiction to decide such cases).
340. 64 F.3d 644, 645-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (deciding whether vacatur for mootness of Board
decision sustaining bid protest could be interpreted to deny successful protester right to recover
protest and proposal costs).
341. PRC, Inc. v. Widnall, 64 F.3d 644, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
342. 68 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
343. Central Ark. Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(holding that Court of Federal Claims had no power to enjoin United States Army Corps from
awarding contract to another bidder, after it determined that no breach of contract had
occurred).
344. OAO Corp. v.Johnson, 49 F.3d 721,726 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that GSBCA has no
jurisdiction under Brooks Act over reverse protest cases).
345. Id. at 723.
346. Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit. VII, §§ 2701-2907, 98 Stat. 1175, 1175-1210 (1984) (codified as
amended in various sections of 10, 31, 40, and 41 U.S.C.).
347. OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 728.
348. Id.
349. Id
350. "A 'reverse protest' is a challenge by the contract awardee to an agency's termination
of the contract for improprieties in the award process." Id at 724; see OAO Corp. v. GSA,
GSBCA No. 12484-P, 94-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 26,392, at 131,295 (1993) [hereinafter OAO 1]
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Act.151 OAO challenged GSA's revocation of the contract. 52 GSA
moved to dismiss under the Brooks Act for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction."58 On September 3, 1993, the GSBCA ruled that it had
jurisdiction and affirmed GSA's termination of the contract.M The
Board concluded that OAO misled GSA regarding the availability of
key personnel and that OAO did not comply with the solicitation
provisions of the contract. 55
On October 14, 1993, the contracting officer informed OAO that,
due to its lack of integrity and ethics, OAO had been non-responsible
and, therefore, barred OAO from further competition for the
contract 5 6 The contracting officer subsequently denied OAO's
reconsideration request.5" OAO did not protest the initial "non-
responsibility" decision or the reconsideration decision.5"
Subsequently, the GSA published Amendment 8 to the solicita-
tion.5 9 This addition changed some pricing and personnel require-
ments.8 ° OAO then requested that the contracting officer allow it
to re-enter the competition on the basis that the amendment
"substantially changed" key requirements of the solicitation including
the criteria upon which the GSBCA had deemed OAO non-responsi-
ble.861 The contracting officer denied the request, and OAO filed
a second protest that the GSBCA dismissed as untimely.62  In its
dismissal, the GSBCA noted that OAO had been excluded from the
competition on the basis of the earlier finding of non-responsibili-
ty.86 The GSBCA indicated that pursuant to its rules, OAO should
have protested within ten days of the initial non-responsibility decision
or at the latest, within ten days of the contracting officer's denial of
its reconsideration.36
(defining reverse protest as "involv[ing] a challenge by the contract awardee to an agency's
decision to terminate a contract based upon improprieties in the award process").
351. OAOI, 94-1 B.CA (CCH), at 131,291.
352. 1&
353. Id. (citing Brooks Automatic Data Processing Act, 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1994), amended by
Pub. L. No. 103-355, §§ 1431-1439, 108 Stat. 3234, 3292-94 (1994) (to be codified as amended
at 40 U.S.C. § 759(f))).
354. OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 723 (citing OAO I, 94-1 B.CA (CCH) at 131,295-96).






361. Id. at 723-24.
362. Id. (citing OAO Corp. v. GSA, GSBCA No. 12718-P, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 2 26,662, at
132,647 (1994)) [hereinafter OAO II].
363. Id (citing OAO 11, 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH) at 132,648-49).
364. Id. (citing OAO 11, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) at 132,648 n.2).
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OAO appealed the dismissal to the Federal Circuit under the
Brooks Act," challenging the Board's jurisdiction over reverse
protests. 3 66 The court commented that the Brooks Act grants "an
interested party" the right to file a "protest" as that term is defined by
statute.36 Under the Act, a "protest" is limited to written objections
based on improprieties by the agency in the bid solicitation or
objections to the proposed or actual award of a contract1 68 The
Board's jurisdiction over protests thus is limited to "objections to the
procurement process or the contract award itself."6 9
The court concluded that because OAO had objected neither to
the propriety of GSA's procurement process, nor to GSA's award of
the contract, it had not filed a "protest" under the Brooks Act.37
Rather, OAO had filed an action seeking to affirm GSA's procure-
ment process and its own contract award."7 OAO's only objection
was to the termination of its contract award. 72 The court stated that
objection to a contract termination is within the jurisdictional scope
of the CDA, not the Brooks Act. 73
Interestingly, after this appeal was filed, Congress amended the
Brooks Act as part of FASA 4  This amendment expanded the
Brooks Act's definition of "protest" in 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) to include
objections to the cancellation of contract awards. Although this
amendment was enacted prior to the court's decision, the court
refused to apply the revised definition retroactively to expand the
Board's Brooks Act jurisdiction to OAO's appeal, stating that "[t]he
plain language of the FASA dictates that the amended definition of
'protest' has only prospective effect" 7 6
Despite the holding of the court in OAO, the GSBCA did acquire
jurisdiction over reverse protests. 7  The Board's revised rules,
365. IL; see 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(6) (1994) (setting forth procedures for appeals).
366. OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 724.
367. Id.; see 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(1).
368. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(0 (9) (A).





374. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, §§ 1431-1439, 108
Stat. 3243, 3291-95 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759); OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 725.
375. 40 U.S.C. § 759(f(9)(A) (1994); OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 725.
376. OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 725. FASA clarified that the revised definition applied
prospectively only. Specifically, FASA provided that its amendments would take effect on the
date provided in final implementing regulations or on October 1, 1995, whichever came first.
FASA, 41 U.S.C. § 251(b) (3) (1994).
377. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (9) (A) (iv) (including termination or cancellation of contract
owner in definition of protest).
1696
199]GVERNMENT CONTRACT CASES
implemented pursuant to the FASA, became effective September 16,
1995.78 Under the amendment to the Brooks Act, the Board
acquired jurisdiction over protests of solicitations, cancellations of
solicitations, awards or proposed awards of contracts, and the
termination or cancellation of such a contract award. 79 This grant
of jurisdiction was short-lived, however. The National Defense
Authorization Act of 1996 removed the bid protestjurisdiction of the
GSBCA.8 °
OAO's appeal to the Federal Circuit also challenged the Board's
dismissal of its second protest relating to the contracting officer's non-
responsibility determination as untimely."1 In considering this
issue, the court noted that a "protest based on anything other than
improprieties in a solicitation shall be filed no later than ten days
after the basis of the protest is known or should have been known,
whichever is earlier."' 2 The court also stated that "[a] party may
obtain reexamination of its responsibility status when ample time
exists and a material change occurs in a principal factor on which the
responsibility determination rests."3' Given the facts here, the con-
tracting officer's non-responsibility determination was based on OAO's
lack of integrity and ethics.' Because Amendment 8 did not
materially change the standards for ethics or integrity applicable to
potential awardees, it did not require the contracting officer to
reassess OAO's responsibility.' s  The contracting officer's second
refusal to reconsider her earlier responsibility determination,
therefore, did not trigger a new protest period.8 To obtain a
hearing before the Board, OAO should have protested after the initial
non-responsibility determination but no later than ten days after the
contracting officer's first refusal to reconsider her responsibility
determination. 7 In sum, the court affirmed the GSBCA's decision
as to OAO's second untimely protest because OAO failed to submit
a timely protest on the non-responsibility determination. s
378. Id
379. See id.
380. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110
Stat. 186 (amending 41 U.S.C. § 251).
381. OAO Corp., 49 F.3d at 726.
382. Id.
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B. Motion for Costs Survives Procurement Cancellation
In PRO, Inc. v. Widnall,8 9 the Federal Circuit considered the
effect of a vacated bid protest decision on a related motion for bid
protest and proposal costs."
In 1991, PRC protested the award by the Air Force of a contract for
local area network system integration and installation to Electronic
Data Systems Corporation ("EDS").311 PRC's protest was sustained
by the GSBCA on the basis that the Air Force had engaged in
practices that were both prohibited and prejudicial to PRC.3
92 PRC
timely filed its Motion for Costs with the GSBCA seeking reimburse-
ment for the costs of prosecuting its protest and its bid prepara-
tion. 93 EDS appealed the Board's underlying protest decision to
the Federal Circuit.3" Before a decision was issued on the EDS
appeal, the Air Force canceled the procurement with the intent of
incorporating it into a future acquisition. 95 PRC then moved to
dismiss EDS's appeal as moot, arguing that because it had a motion
for costs pending before the GSBCA, the court should not vacate the
underlying protest decision.3 19 The court denied PRC's motion to
dismiss and instead vacated as moot the Board's decision sustaining
PRC's protest, remanding the case to the GSBCA to dismiss PRC's
protest complaint.
397
On remand, the GSBCA dismissed PRC's protest complaint98 and
then dismissed PRC's motion for costs for lack of jurisdiction."'
The Board based its decision on the ill-founded belief that the court's
unqualified vacatur order nullified the underlying protest decision
and that such nullification eliminated PRC's right to recover bid
protest and preparation costs under 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (5) (B) and
389. 64 F.3d 644 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
390. PRC, Inc. v. Widnall, 64 F.3d 644, 645 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
391. Id.
392. lM; Network Solutions, Inc. v. Department of Air Force, GSBCA Nos. 11498-P, 11532-P,
92-3 B.C.A (CCH) 25,083 at 125,049, vacated as moot sub nom. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v.
Rice, 988 F.2d 128 (unpublished table decision), No. 92-1511, 1992 WL 436547 (Fed. Cir, Dec.
2, 1992).
393. PRC, Inc., 64 F.3d at 645; see 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(5) (C) (1994).
394. PRC, Inc., 64 F.3d at 645.
395. Id
396. Id.
397. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Rice, 988 F.2d 128 (unpublished table decision), No. 92-
1511, 1992 WL 436547 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 1992); PRC, Inc., 64 F.3d at 645 (citing United States
v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)).
398. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, GSBCA Nos. 11498-P-REM,
11532-P-REM, 1993 WL 33071 (Feb. 10, 1993); PRC, Inc., 64 F.d at 645.
399. PRC, Inc. v. Deptartment of Air Force, GSBCA Nos. 11864-C, 11532-P, 94-3 B.C.A
(CCH) 1 27,159, at 135,341 (1994); PRC, Inc., 64 F.3d at 646.
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(C) .' The Board based its decision on the fact that the Federal
Circuit handed down an unqualified vacatur order despite the fact
that the court could have qualified its order so as to permit expressly
the recovery of such costs."m
PRC appealed the Board's dismissal of its motion for costs,
4 °2
arguing that Supreme Court precedent in Crowell v. Madi 4° re-
quired the Board to interpret the vacatur order so as not to prejudice
PRC's right to recover protest and proposal costs. 41 The Air Force
argued that the court's vacatur order nullified the GSBCA's finding
of an Air Force violation in the procurement process and because
such a determination was a necessary prerequisite to PRC's claim,
PRC should not be allowed to recover its costs.405
On appeal, the court sided with PRC, holding that its earlier
vacatur order should be interpreted so as not to conflict with
precedent established in Crowell.4°6 Crowell established that in cases
in which the issues raised on appeal have become moot but the whole
case has not become moot (that is, some portion of the case remains
to be decided by the lower court), "it is 'inappropriate' to vacate the
decision below with instructions to dismiss 'the entire action. "'407
The court found that PRC's motion for costs was not at issue in EDS's
appeal to the Federal Circuit or in PRC's motion to dismiss the
appeal, and was not specifically addressed in the court's vacatur
order.41 Consequently, the court held that its vacatur order did not
deprive the Board of jurisdiction to decide PRC's motion for
costs.' The court further held that its vacatur order did not affect
the existence of the Board's underlying protest decision for purposes
of considering PRC's motion for costs. 410  The court, therefore,
reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case to the Board for
decision on PRC's motion for costs.
411
400. PRC, Inc., 64 F.d at 646 (quoting PRC, Inc., 94-3 B.C.A. (CCH) at 135,339).
401. Id
402. Id. at 645.
403. 444 U.S. 505, 506 (1980).
404. PRC, Inc., 64 F.3d at 646.
405. Id
406. Id. at 647.
407. Id. at 646 (quoting Crowell v. Mader, 444 U.S. 505, 506 (1980)).
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C. Authority to Grant Equitable Relief
Congress has granted the Court of Federal Claims the power to
award equitable relief in connection with its bid protest jurisdic-
tion.4 12 In 1995, the Federal Circuit, in Central Arkansas Maintenance,
Inc. v. United States,413 squarely addressed the scope of the Court of
Federal Claims' power to enjoin a contract award pursuant to an
action by a disappointed bidder. 14  An Army Corps of Engineers
contract for lake maintenance services in central Arkansas was at
stake.41 5  Central Arkansas Maintenance, Inc. ("CAM"), and
Ferguson-Williams were two of eleven bidders for the Arkansas Lakes
contract.
416
In its initial bid, Ferguson-Williams included the resume of one
Charles Hargett.4 7 At the time, Hargett was a government employ-
ee responsible for managing some of the resources included in the
contract, but he was planning to retire from his government posi-
tion.418  Hargett had some involvement on the government side in
preparation of the Arkansas Lakes solicitation.419 Despite Hargett's
position and responsibilities related to the Arkansas Lakes work,
agency counsel for the Corps initially determined that Hargett did not
have any post-employment restrictions that would affect his potential
employment with Ferguson-Williams. 4 ° Agency counsel specifically
addressed this issue as it related to the Procurement Integrity Act
post-employment restrictions.'
21
After agency counsel responded to the concerns of Corps evaluators
about Hargett's inclusion in Ferguson-Williams' bid, the contracting
officer established the competitive range. 2  Three firms, including
412. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (3) (1994). The Federal Courts ImprovementAct of 1982 provides
in pertinent part: "To afford complete relief on any contract claim brought before the contract
is awarded, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments and such
equitable and extraordinary relief as it deems proper, including but not limited to, injunctive
relief." Id
413. 68 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
414. Central Ark. Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1338, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1340.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1339-40.
419. Id
420. Id at 1340.
421. Id Agency counsel determined that Mr. Hargett had not "participated substantially"
in the development of the solicitation and therefore was not a "procurement official" under the
Procurement Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. § 423 (1994). Central Ark., 68 F.3d at 1340. As a result,





Ferguson-Williams, remained in the competitive range after the initial
evaluation of bids. CAM dropped out.4" The Corps then requested
that those firms in the competitive range submit best and final
offers.424
During evaluation of the best and final offers, the issue of Hargett's
participation on the Ferguson-Williams team resurfaced.4' This
time, however, agency counsel determined that there was a conflict of
interest problem and recommended that Hargett be removed from
the Ferguson-Williams team.42 Hargett removed himself from the
team, and the contracting officer requested a second round of best
and final offers for the purpose of curing any possible taint to the
procurement process that may have resulted from Hargett's relation-
ship with Ferguson-Williams. 427  After evaluation of the second
round offers, the contracting officer awarded the Arkansas Lakes
contract to Ferguson-Williams.428
CAM subsequently filed a complaint alleging improper and illegal
activity by the Corps and seeking injunctive relief.429 The protest
was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, but that court transferred the case to the Court of Federal
Claims.430
CAM advanced three arguments in its bid protest (1) the Corps
had improperly excluded CAM's proposal from the competitive range;
(2) the solicitation was unduly vague; and (3) Ferguson-Williams'
actions were in violation of the procurement integrity laws and the
conflict of interest statutes and regulations.41 As an alternative
argument, CAM called for the cancellation and resolicitation of the
Request for Proposals. 2
The Court of Federal Claims found that the contracting officer did
not exclude CAM arbitrarily from the competitive range. 3 Further,











433. Idt CAM's proposal was not within the competitive range. It
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have been made before CAM submitted its proposal.' CAM did
not appeal either of these determinations. 5
CAM's third challenge to the procurement process presented the
most interesting issue in this case. The Court of Federal Claims
found that the Corps' "contracting officer, Hargett, and Ferguson-
Williams either violated, or were about to violate, provisions of the
Procurement Integrity Act."4  The court further ruled that these
"violations, or imminent violations, did not taint the entire procure-
ment and did not deprive CAM of its right to have its offer considered fairly
and honestly."4' 7 On the basis of these findings, the court declined
either to order the Corps to put CAM in the competitive range or to
restart the procurement process.'M Despite its findings, however,
the Court of Federal Claims permanently enjoined the Corps from
awarding the contract to Ferguson-Williams, in reliance on United




The sole issue before the Federal Circuit in Central Arkansas
Maintenance was whether the Court of Federal Claims "exceeded its
statutory authority to grant equitable relief by enjoining the award of
the Arkansas Lakes contract to Ferguson-Williams, after finding that
CAM's offer had been considered fairly and honestly and that any procurement
integrity violations had not tainted the entire procurement.""3
As a preliminary matter, the Federal Circuit addressed the Court of
Federal Claims' basis for jurisdiction over the protest by CAM,
because the Court of Federal Claims' powers to grant relief are tied
specifically to the various areas of its jurisdiction.4" The Court of
Federal Claims had exercisedjurisdiction over CAM's protest pursuant
to language in the Tucker Act"2 providing the court with jurisdic-
tion over breach of an "implied contract."' Specifically, the court
exercised jurisdiction over the Government's "'implied contract to
have the involved bids fairly and honestly considered.'"44 4  The
court explained that one means of establishing a breach of this
434. Id.
435. Id. at 1341.
436. Id.
437. Id. (emphasis added).
438. Id.
439. Id. (citing United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961)).
440. Id. (emphasis added).
441. I.
442. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
443. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1). The TuckerAct grants the Court of Federal Claimsjurisdiction
"to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded.., upon any express
or implied contract with the United States." Id.
444. Centra Ark., 68 F.3d at 1341 (quoting United States v.John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d
1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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implied contract is to show a violation of a procurement statute or
regulation.' 4 To obtain relief, however, the protester must establish
that the violation is "clear and prejudicial."' A lesser violation, or
one that does not affect the protester, will not entitle the protester to
obtain relief. 7
If breach of this implied contract occurs, the Court of Federal
Claims has power to exercise its injunctive power to "afford complete
relief" to the litigant in the pre-award bid protest.' This language
expresses congressional intent that a court's injunctive power be used
only to grant relief to the protester.49 If the protester does not
obtain relief from a court's exercise of this power, then the court has
exceeded its authority.5" Here, the Court of Federal Claims' action
in enjoining Ferguson-Williams from receipt of the Arkansas Lakes
contract did not provide any relief to CAM because CAM remained
outside of the competitive range. Under these circumstances, in
which CAM was not entitled to relief because CAM's implied contract
was not breached, the court held that the Court of Federal Claims
clearly exceeded its authority to exercise its injunctive powers."
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the Government's
argument that the Court of Federal Claims was entitled to exercise
injunctive relief more broadly in order to protect the integrity of the
procurement process in situations in which violations of conflict of
445. Id. at 1342 (citing Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1204 (Ct. CI.
1974)).
446. Id. (citing CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
447. IL The violation must be "arbitrary and capricious toward the bidder-claimant" to
entitle the disappointed bidder to relief. Id at 1341 (citing Keco Indus., 492 F.2d at 1203); see
Prineville Sawmill Co. v. United States, 859 F.2d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also S. REP. No.
275,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22,23 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CA.N. 11, 32 (stating that courts'
injunctive powers should be exercised "only in circumstances where the contract, if awarded,
would be the result of arbitrary or capricious action by the contracting officials, to deny qualified
finms the opportunity to compete fairly for the procurement award").
448. CentralArk., 68 F.3d at 1342 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (3) (1994) (emphasis added)).
449. Id. The court relied on language in the Senate Report on the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, which provides that § 133 gives the Court of Federal Claims "the
ability to grant litigants complete relief." S. REP. No., 275 supra note 447, at 22, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.CAN. at 32.
The Senate Report states further that the court's injunctive power should be exercised
"only in circumstances where the contract, if awarded, would be the result of arbitrary
or capricious action by the contracting officials, to deny qualified firms the opportunity
to compete fairly for the procurement award." Thus, Congress intended the court to
use the equitable power of section 1491(a) (3) to grant qualified firms, which are
parties determined to have been denied the opportunity to compete fairly for a
government contract, injunctive relief.
Central Ark, 68 F.3d at 1342-43 (internal citation omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 275, supra note
447, at 23, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. at 33).
450. Central Ark., 68 F.3d at 1343.
451. Id.
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interest statutes are involved. 2  The Government derived its
argument from United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,'
which the court readily distinguished. That case concerned the
avoidance of a contract affected by a conflict of interest, not the
exercise of a court's statutory-based authority as Central Arkansas
Maintenance did.' The court also made the point that if Congress
was concerned that the court's powers were insufficient to address
conflict of interest violations affecting the integrity of a procurement,
then Congress, not the courts, must fix the problem. 55
III. TERMINATIONS: ToRNcLLO NOT EXTENDED
The Government has long been considered to have very broad
discretion in deciding when and under what circumstances to exercise
its contractual right to terminate a contract under the Termination
for Convenience clause. One seemingly important exception was
carved out in 1982, when the United States Court of Claims decided
Torncello v. United States.' 6 The Navy awarded Torncello a require-
ments contract for pest control that obligated the Government to
procure all the pest control services it required from Torncello.
57
The Navy awarded the contract despite its knowledge that a lower bid
had been submitted.45 Subsequently, Torncello did not receive any
work under the contract because the Navy gave the work to the low
bidder, the Navy Department of Public Works.459 The court in
Torncello held that the constructive termination of Torncello's contract
was not available to excuse the Navy's breach in failing to provide the
work to Torncello when it knew of the lower price prior to making
the contract award."1° Although the court's decision in Torncello
established precedent for cases in which the Government was
relatively certain in advance of making an award that it would not
honor the contract, it did not speak to situations in which the
Government has pre-award knowledge of facts that might make a
termination desirable at some point after contract award.
452. 1I
453. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
454. Central Ark, 68 F.3d at 1343.
455. Id. ("If these remedies are insufficient, the responsibility for stronger measures lies with
Congress.").
456. 681 F.2d 756 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
457. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 758 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
458. Id
459. Id.
460. Id. at 772.
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The Federal Circuit addressed this situation in 1995 in the case of
Caldwell & Santmye, Inc. v. Glickmane6 and refused to expand
Tormcello 62 In April 1992, the Department of Agriculture solicited
bids for a plant laboratory in Beltsville, Maryland. 63 The specifica-
tions and equipment schedule in the contract listed two categories of
equipment as "vendor furnished/vendor installed."4" Caldwell was
a bidder, but R.J. Crowley submitted the lowest bid." After the
agency asked Crowley to submit the cost summary sheets it had used
in preparing its bid, Crowley informed the agency that it had made
two mathematical errors in its bid." The agency also discovered
that Crowley had omitted the "vendor installed/vendor furnished"
equipment costs. 467 The agency permitted Crowley to withdraw its
bid on August 8, 1992, making Caldwell the lowest remaining
bidder.4
Because of the problems with the Crowley bid, the agency contact
person, in the absence of the contracting officer, asked Cadwell for
its cost sheets, 469 which showed that Caldwell also had not included
any costs for the "vendor furnished/vendor installed" equipment.4 70
When the contracting officer returned from vacation, he was angry
that Caldwell had been asked for the cost sheets because, in his view,
the agency had no reason to believe that Caldwell's bid contained an
error that would require verification. 7
Caldwell was awarded the contract on September 7, 1992.2 On
October 5, 1992, after personally reviewing Caldwell's bid for the first
time, the contracting officer also concluded that Caldwell had not
included any costs for the "vendor fumished/vendor installed"
equipment.47 The next day he wrote Caldwell a letter stating that
it was responsible for supplying the equipment and asking for a
corrected bid in accordance with "mistake after award" proce-
461. 55 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
462. Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995).








471. Id. Thisjudgment was based on the analysis of the architectural/engineering firm that
had prepared the specifications for the project and on the amounts of the next three lowest
bids. Id.
472. Id
473. Id. at 1580.
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dures.4 4  He also directed that no work proceed under the con-
tract.45 Caldwell replied that it had not made a mistake, as it
interpreted the provision to require the agency to furnish the
equipment involved.47  After reviewing the specifications, the
contracting officer concluded that the provision was not precisely
defined, and therefore, Caldwell had not made a mistake in its
bid.
477
Thereafter, the agency estimated that the cost of supplying the
equipment would be between $200,000 and $300,000 and "decided
not to proceed under a contract that would require such a material
alteration."478 Consequently, on November 23, 1992, the agency
terminated Caldwell's contract for convenience.479
OnJanuary 5, 1993, Caldwell submitted two settlement proposals to
the contracting officer: (1) a termination for convenience proposal
in the amount of $24,669.13, and (2) a proposal for breach of
contract in the amount of $148,123.66.4"' The first proposal, which
was accepted and paid by the agency, included overhead expenses,
settlement expenses, and standard markups."' The second propos-
al sought to recover lost profits, overhead, and a bonding premi-
um.4 12 Citing Torncello, Caldwell asserted that the agency could not
use the Termination for Convenience clause "to terminate a contract
where the circumstances of the bargain or the expectations of the
parties have not changed."'  According to Caldwell, the agency
interpreted Torncello to mean that it could not use the termination for
convenience clause simply to avoid "a bad deal it was aware of, or
should have been aware of, at the time of the contract award."
484
474. Id.; see 48 C.F.R. § 14.407-4 (1995) (stating that contractor shall support claim of
mistake by submitting written statement and relevant evidence such as data contractor used in
preparing bid and bids of contractors and suppliers).




479. Id. In a termination letter, the Contracting Officer notified Caldwell
that the contract had been erroneously awarded, that the solicitation contained
defective specifications susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, that
other bidders on the project also may have omitted the costs of 'vendor fur-
nished/vendor installed' equipment, that the ambiguity of the specifications impeded










The AGBCA granted summary judgment in favor of the agency,
observing that the clause appeared to have been used "'for its
intended purpose of ending an improvident procurement.'" 485 It
found "'no evidence [that] the Government intended before award
to terminate the contract for any reason. '
Citing Torncello, the Federal Circuit noted in affirming the Board's
decision:
We have stated that "[i] t is not the province of the courts to decide
de novo whether termination was the best course." In the absence
of bad faith or clear abuse of discretion the contracting officer's
election to terminate is conclusive. We assume the government acts
in good faith when contracting. A contractor can overcome this
presumption only if it shows through "well-nigh irrefragable proof'
that the government had a specific intent to injure it.4"'
The court held that the facts did not support Caldwell's claims of
either bad faith or abuse of discretion and that there was no
impropriety in the Government's exercise of its contractual right to
terminate.4' The court distinguished Torneello by reference to
Salsbury Industries v. United States 9 in which the Federal Circuit held:
"'[Torneello] stands for the unremarkable proposition that when the
Government contracts with a party knowing full well that it will not
honor the contract, it cannot avoid a breach claim by adverting to the
convenience termination clause.'" 4 °  The court remarked that
Caldwell was
asking us to extend Torncello to the situation in which the govern-
ment contracts in good faith but, at the same time, has knowledge
of facts supposedly putting it on notice that, at some future date,
it may be appropriate to terminate the contract for convenience.
We decline the invitation. We see no merit in putting such an
additional limitation on the government's use of the termination
for convenience clause.49'
By emphasizing that bad faith was a prerequisite to a successful
Torneello claim, the Federal Circuit left intact the broad discretion
government contracting officers have with respect to exercising their
right to terminate a contract for the convenience of the Government.
485. IM. (quoting Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., AGBCA No. 93-191-1, 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
126,854, at 133,625 (1993)).
486. I& (citing Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., 94-2 B.CA. (CCH), at 133,625).
487. IM. at 1581 (quoting Torncello, 681 F.2d at 770) (citations omitted).
488. Id,
489. 905 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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IV. CosTs
A. Peformance Versus Litigation Costs Examined
If a "non-routine" request for payment is by definition a CDA claim,
as in the court's decision in Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton,492 what effect
does that have on the allowability of costs contained in the claim?
For example, legal, accounting, and consulting fees commonly are
incurred in the preparation of a termination for convenience
settlement proposal, and generally have been allowable.493  If that
same proposal will be deemed a CDA claim under the Reflectone
ruling, are those costs still allowable, or are they barred as unallow-
able costs of prosecuting a claim against the Government?4 Bill
Strong Enterprises, Inc. v. Shannon,495 a case decided three months
before the Reflectone rehearing decision, is an interesting companion
to Reflectone.
In 1987, the Army awarded Bill Strong Enterprises ("BSE") a
fixed-price contract for the renovation of family housing units.496
Approximately one year after the contract award, BSE notified the
Army that houses were being released out of sequence, resulting in
increased costs, estimated at $1.5 million.497 The contracting officer
requested an itemization of BSE's costs and told BSE that an audit
would be necessary.49 BSE submitted a claim for $520,001 in May
1989 and certified cost and pricing data in June.499  The housing
renovation was completed and accepted by the Government in July
1989.5° In September 1989, BSE hired Excell, a consulting firm, to
revise its data for resubmission to the contracting officer. 10' BSE
then submitted a revised certified claim for $995,568 in November
492. 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
493. See48 C.F.R. § 31.205-4 2(g) (i) (1995) (including reasonable "accounting, legal, clerical,
and similar costs" in list of allowable settlement expenses).
494. See id. § 31.205-47 (defining costs of prosecuting claim as including legal, accounting,
and consulting costs). Whether a termination for convenience claim is a CDA claim under the
ruling of Reflectone has yet to be decided. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text
(discussing key distinction in Reflectone between routine and non-routine submissions for
payment).
495. 49 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1995), ovemded by Reflectone v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
496. Bill Strong Enters., Inc. v. Shannon, 49 F.3d 1541, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1995), overruled by
Reflectone v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
497. Id.





including $122,336 for Excell's work in preparing the submission. °2
The Government noted that the Changes clause of the contract
governed BSE's REA and that the Government was assuming that BSE
was not requesting a final decision at that time.5 3 A subsequent
audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency ("DCAA") questioned
$529,572 of BSE's claimed cost increase, but did not question the
amount claimed for Excell's costs.5 The parties settled the delay
costs for $290,000, but the contracting officer denied the recovery of
Excell's costs on the grounds that the Excell work was performed after
completion of the contract work and therefore was "not incurred in
connection with the actual performance of the work. 50 5  BSE
appealed to the ASBCA.5 6
BSE argued to the ASBCA that consultant costs can be recovered
if they pertain to the presentation of costs stemming "from a
performance-related claim that the Government did not dispute."507 BSE
also argued that the Excell costs were related to its administration of
and performance under the contract, and did not arise from the
pursuit of a claim against the Government.508 Finally, BSE argued
that the claim never became so "disputatious" as to reach the level of
a claim against the Government.5" The Government took the
position that a claim against it existed at the time Excell was hired,
and that, therefore, the consultant fees were incurred in the prosecu-
tion of that claim." The Government contended that the costs
were incurred after completion of the contract and thus could not be
performance related.5 '
In a 3-2 decision, the ASBCA denied BSE's appeal, finding that the
Government disputed the amount of the claim at the time of the
November submission, and that the submission was a valid claim
under Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States51 2 and FAR 33.201.1




505. Id at 1543-44.
506. IeL at 1544.





512. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
513. Bill Strong, 49 F.3d at 1544.
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tion of contract performance." 4 BSE appealed the ASBCA deci-
sion.515
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by holding that the FAR
provided a "specific, clear, bright-line test for unallowability: a legal,
accounting, or consulting cost incurred in connection with the
prosecution of a CDA claim or an appeal against the Government is
per se unallowable."51 The court then turned to the question of
what is meant by the phrase "incurred in connection with the
prosecution of a [CDA] claim against the government." 17 The
court wrote that there are at least three distinct categories of legal,
accounting, and consulting costs in the FAR cost principles: costs
incurred in contract performance, in contract administration, and in
prosecuting a CDA claim." 8 To assess the allowability of a cost, it
must be classified into a category:
In classifying a particular cost ... courts should examine the
objective reason why the contractor incurred the cost. If a
contractor incurred the cost for the genuine purpose of materially
furthering the negotiation process, such cost should normally be a
contract administration cost allowable under FAR 31.205-33, even
if the negotiation eventually fails and a CDA claim is later submit-
ted. On the other hand, if a contractor's underlying purpose for
incurring a cost is to promote the prosecution of a CDA claim
against the Government, then such cost is unallowable under FAR
31.205-33.519
Applying the test to the Bill Strongfacts, the Federal Circuit reversed
the Board majority, finding that prior to the November submission,
the parties were in a negotiation posture. The Government never
disputed BSE's right to increased compensation; it claimed to be
conducting an audit and was requesting more information merely to
help it analyze BSE's request. 20 "This exchange of information is
exactly what is encompassed in the concept of contract administra-
tion."
21
The court next held that BSE's November submission was not a
formal CDA claim because: (1) BSE did not request a final decision;
(2) the parties had not reached a dispute stage; and (3) the parties
514. I&
515. Md
516. Id. at 1549.
517. Id.
518. Id.





remained in a state of negotiation and exchange of information
following the submission.522 This conclusion was overruled, howev-
er, by the same court's decision in Reflectone four months later.23
Under the Reflectone analysis, BSE's November submission would have
been considered certified and clearly "non-routine."524 Further-
more, applying the court's logic in Bill Strong, a holding that the
November submission was a CDA claim would not have affected the
allowability of the Excell costs, because the court clearly found that
they were incurred as contract administration costs in support of the
negotiations.5" The fact that the costs were included as part of a
CDA claim does not make them per se unallowable, so long as they
were incurred as part of contract performance or administration.526
The lesson of Bill Strong is that even though a submission may be
"non-routine," costs included in the submission that would be
disallowed if incurred in prosecution of a claim against the Govern-
ment may be allowed even if they are part of a CDA claim. 27 The same
logic would extend to such costs if they were part of a "routine"
submission that is in dispute. Thus, the focus of the analysis hereafter
must shift from the nature of the submission to the circumstances
under which the costs were incurred.
B. Corporate Reorganization Not a Change in Accounting Practice
When the Cost Accounting Standards ("CAS") apply to a cost
contract under the FAR, the contractor must "disclose to the
government [its] cost accounting practices, notify the government
when it changes its disclosed practices, and submit cost impact
proposals which allow adjustments in the contract price if the changes
result in increased costs to the government. "528
In Perry v. Martin Marietta Corp.,29 the Federal Circuit faced, in
the context of a major corporate reorganization, the question of what
comprises a change in cost accounting practices."' Affirming the
ASBCA's determination that a corporate reorganization resulting in
expanded cost pools is not a change in cost accounting practices
522. Id.
523. Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1579 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
524. Id. at 1575-76.
525. Bill Strong, 49 F.3d at 1546-50.
526. See id. at 1550 (noting that courts should look at objective reason why contractor
incurred costs rather than at existence or non-existence of claim).
527. Id.
528. 63 Fed. Cont. Rep. 551 (1995); see 48 C.F.R. § 30.201-4 (1995) (setting forth the
disclosure requirements).
529. 47 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
530. Perry v. Martin Marietta Corp., 47 F.3d 1134, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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within the meaning FAR 52.230-3 and 52.230-4,"' the Federal
Circuit held that the only changes triggering additional disclosure
requirements are changes to the "proportional measurement,
assignment or allocation of costs."
531 2
In Pery, Martin Marietta Corporation ("MMC") underwent internal
corporate reorganizations that resulted in the dissolution of one of its
three intermediate home offices.33 Before it was dissolved, the
home office had been responsible for collecting the indirect expenses
incurred by its five business segments and for grouping them into
three pools.5- 4 These expenses were proportionately allocated back
to each segment and applied against the government contracts that
the segments were performing
5 35
The corporate reorganization also resulted in the realignment of
three business segments that previously had reported to the dissolved
intermediate home office. 36  These three business segments were
realigned to report directly to corporate headquarters.53 7  The
indirect expenses incurred by these three segments were collected
and grouped into cost pools maintained by headquarters."s The
remaining two segments reported to a new intermediate home
office.3 9  As at headquarters, indirect costs incurred by these two
segments were collected by the new home office and grouped into
cost pools.
54°
Because the formula employed for allocating the costs back to the
segments and their respective contracts varied slightly after reorganiza-
tion, 41 MMC filed a cost impact statement as required by FAR
52.230." 2 MMC did not include in its cost impact proposal any
531. Martin Marietta Corp., ASBCA Nos. 38920, 41565, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 25,115, at
125,458; see 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.230-3, 52.230-4.
532. Peny, 47 F.3d at 1189.
533. Id. at 1135.
534. Id The three cost pools were marketing, foreign marketing, and residual. Id.
535. Id. The intermediate home office allocated on the basis of sales, foreign sales, and total
cost input. Id.
536. Id. at 1136.
537. Id.
538. Id Headquarters maintained the same cost pools that the former intermediate office
had maintained: marketing, foreign marketing, and residual. Id.
539. Id
540. Id The intermediate home office collected costs in only two pools: marketing and
residual. Id.
541. Id Costs that previously had been allocated from the pools on the basis of a single
factor (that is, sales or total cost input) would now be allocated according to a three-factor
formula. Id.
542. FAR Clause 52.230-2(a) (2) provides, "If any change in cost accounting practice is made
for the purposes of any contract or subcontract subject to CAS requirements, the change must
be applied prospectively to this contract .. " 48 C.F.Rt § 52.230-2(a) (2) (1995). FAR Clause
52.230-6(b) includes a requirement that the contractor "submit a cost impact proposal in the
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changes in the grouping of indirect costs or business segments
resulting from the reorganization." The Government audited the
proposal and determined that no contract modification was re-
quired.5 However, because additional allocations were applied
against his contract, a Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA")
contracting officer decided that the expansion of the cost pools at
headquarters and the new intermediate office constituted a change in
cost accounting practices for which no cost impact statement had
been filed." Accordingly, the FAA contracting officer denied
reimbursement of the new costs allocated to the contract. 46 MMC
filed suit in the United States Claims Court contesting this deci-
sion.547
Because MMC believed that the FAA contracting officer was not the
"cognizant" contracting officer to render this decision, MMC
additionally requested a decision from a Department of Defense
("DOD") contracting officer.5¢  Sixty days later, MMC appealed a
"deemed denial" from the DOD contracting officer to the ASBCA.549
The ASBCA ruled in favor of MMC, holding that organizational
changes, such as those incurred as a result of MMC's corporate
reorganization, did not constitute changes to an accounting prac-
tice.J The Government appealed the Board's decision to the
Federal Circuit.551
Because FAR 52.230-3 and 52.230-4 implement the CAS but do not
expressly define a change in accounting practice, the Federal Circuit
turned to various regulations implemented by the GAS Board to
interpret the meaning of "cost accounting practice" as used in FAR
52.230-3 and 52.230-4.552 Interestingly, the court undertook its
review de novo and refused to accord any deference to agency
interpretations of the FAR provisions on the grounds that the FAR
form and manner specified by the Contracting Officer" when a change in accounting practice
is made. 48 C.F.R. § 52.230-6(b) (1996).




547. Id. at 1136 n.4.
548. Id. at 1135.
549. Id. After the appeal was filed, the contracting officer determined that the corporate
reorganization did constitute a change in accounting practice and that a new cost impact
proposal was required to be submitted. Id. MMC also appealed this decision to the Board,
which consolidated this appeal with the appeal already pending. Id.
550. Id. at 1135-36.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 1137-39; see 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.230-3, 52.230-4 (1995).
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and the CAS are not regulations of the Department of Defense.
553
Relying on definitions, illustrations, and a preamble contained in the
CAS regulations, the court determined that the CAS Board intended
to limit "cost accounting practice" to accounting "methods or tech-
niques."5" Furthermore, the court reasoned that a change in size
or composition of cost pools is not a change in the "method or
technique" triggering 52.230-3 or 52.230-4. 555 The Court stated:
[T]he phrase "change to a cost accounting practice," as used in the
FAR and MMC's CAS-covered contracts, refers to changes in the
proportional measurement, assignment or allocation of costs. The
Secretary's contention that merely changing the size of cost pools
or the groupings of segments as a result of a reorganization causes
a cost accounting practice change must be rejected. Organizational
changes alone do not create a change in a cost accounting
practice.56
In sum, the court found there was no other change to a cost
accounting practice that occurred as a result of reorganization that
was not already disclosed by MMC in its proposal.557
The Perry case has sparked considerable reaction. Following the
Federal Circuit affirmance, a CAS Board advance notice of proposed
rulemaking ("ANPRM") was issued seeking to expand the current
definition of "cost accounting practice" from "methods or techniques"
to include, "'policies' and 'procedures' used to 'accumulate' as well
as to allocate, assign or measure costs."55 Furthermore, the Board
553. Perry, 47 F.3d at 1135 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6
F.3d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Perhaps the court's refusal to defer to agency interpretations
of the GAS and the FAR is inappropriate. Tribunals routinely defer to agency regulations on
the theory that agencies have greater expertise in that area. The GAS Board and the two FAR
councils, while not independent agencies, are comprised of agency representatives. A
representative from the Department of Defense and a representative from the General Services
Administration comprise two of five members on the GAS Board. Members of both FAR
councils (the DAR and CAA Councils) serve as representatives to their respective agencies. 48
C.F.R. § 1.201-1. Thus, it is at least arguable that the GAS Board and the FAR Councils are
extensions of administrative agencies and that agency interpretations of the CAS and the FAR
should be given deference.
554. Perry, 47 F.3d at 1137. These GAS regulations are presently codified at 48 C.F.R. pt.
9903. The regulations define "cost accounting practice" as "any... method or technique which
is used for allocation of cost to cost objectives, assignment of cost to cost accounting periods,
or measurement of cost," and illustrate changes that meet the definition of "change in cost
accounting practice." Id. § 9903.302-1. The particular illustration relied on by the Board and
the Federal Circuit is set forth at 48 C.F.R. § 9903.302-3(c).
555. Perry, 47 F.3d at 1139-40; see 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.230-3, 52.230-4.
556. Perry, 47 F.3d at 1139-40.
557. Id.
558. Letter fromJohn B. Miller, Chair, American BarAssociation Section of Public Contract
Law, to Rudolph J. Schuhbauer, Project Director, Cost Accounting Standards Board, Office of
Federal Procurement Policy 2 (July 10, 1995) (on file with The American University Law Review)
[hereinafter Miller Letter] (citing ANPRM at 32, 34). The goal of the ANPRM was summarized
as:
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proposed that the language "change to a cost accounting practice"
should be amended to include language stating that "[a] change in
cost accounting practice would ... occur after an organizational
change if an ongoing function is transferred to a new or different
indirect cost pool or allocation base or if indirect cost pools or
allocation bases are combined or otherwise fragmented."55 9
This flurry of activity derived from the Government's concern that
the current interpretation of the CAS and its illustrations place the
risk of increased costs resulting from unilateral voluntary ac-
tion-corporate reorganization-squarely on the Government.l
Of particular concern was the use of otherwise unnecessary corporate
reorganization to recoup additional costs from the Government.-
61
Not surprisingly, and especially in a competitive era marked by
industry-wide downsizing, contractors strongly support the current
interpretation of the GAS.562
Thus, Perry sits at the center of a heated controversy that will
remain unresolved until the promulgation of a final CAS Board rule
regarding cost accounting practices." Whatever the outcome, the
case's significance may not be limited to its interpretation of "cost
accounting practices" as set forth by the current CAS and the
Revising the definitions and illustrations governing cost accounting practice changes,
for purposes of making it explicit that a change in the manner in which costs are
grouped and accumulated constitutes a change in cost accounting practice and that
organizational changes must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in order to determine
if a change in cost accounting practice has occurred.
60 Fed. Reg. 20,252, 20,253 (1995). For an outline of the staff discussion paper issued by the
GAS Board following the ASBCA decision, see 59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 495, 498-99 (1993)
(summarizing staff discussion paper issued by CAS Board which solicits comments on nine
proposed changes to cost accounting practices); 59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 811, 821 (1993)
(declaring that organization changes do not by themselves constitute changes in cost accounting
practices).
559. 63 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 543,552 (1995). Additionally, an existing illustration would
be replaced with two new illustrations depicting changes in cost accounting practices consistent
with the revised definitions. Id.
560. 59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 811, 822 (1993).
561. I&
562. Id. Contractors address government concerns by pointing out that organizational
changes usually are undertaken for legitimate business reasons. Id. This position is buttressed
by the fact that the Government may take action against contractors who undergo organizational
changes without legitimate purposes. Itd; see Perry v. Martin Marietta Corp., 47 F.3d 1134, 1140
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Truth in Negotiations Act, Pub. L. No. 87-653, § 1(e), 76 Stat. 528,
528-29 (1962) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2306(f), 2306a (1994))).
Industry also takes the position that an expanded view of the GAS definitions ultimately
injures all the participants in the procurement process, arguing that "[c]ompanies will be
reluctant to make changes when administrative and pricing impacts are considered, even where
such changes will have long-term benefit for the Government, the contractor, and the economy."
59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 811, 823 (1993); see Miller Letter, supra note 558 (providing
comprehensive discussion of industry's myriad problems with the ANPRM).
563. On September 19, 1996, the GAS Board announced a notice of proposed rulemaking
on cost accounting practices. See 61 Fed. Reg. 49,196 (1996).
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implementing FAR provisions." In refusing to afford any defer-
ence to agency interpretations of the FAR and the CAS, the Federal
Circuit may have established a principle with lasting implications as
great as those generated by the substantive decision on what
constitutes a change in a cost accounting practice.56
C. Directed Change in Accounting System Constitutes
Constructive Change
In 1995, the Federal Circuit also faced the issue of whether a
Government-ordered change in the contractor's accounting methods
constituted a constructive change entitling the contractor to an
equitable adjustment. In Aydin Corp. (West) v. Widnall,' the court
employed traditional constructive change analysis-interpretation of
the contract language-to conclude that an ordered change to the
contractor's allocation and billing method entitled the contractor to
relief.5 67
Aydin held a multi-year, firm-fixed-price requirements contract to
produce ground-based radar simulators called Multiple Threat Emitter
Systems ("MUTES").5 68 A "progress payments" clause in the con-
tract provided that the contractor receive payments based on a
percentage of its "cumulative total costs under [the] contract."
569
Accordingly, the contractor accumulated all of the costs it incurred in
individual delivery orders as costs of a single contract, later allocating
the total cost equally among the total delivery orders, and requested
progress payments as a percentage of its cumulative total costs on the
MUTES contract.
7 °
The contracting officer, however, interpreted the Progress Payment
provision as requiring Aydin to segregate its cost and to submit
564. 48 C.F.R. § 52.230-3 (1995).
565. See 37 THE GOVERNMENT CONTRAcrOR 95, at 6 (Feb. 22, 1995). But seeAydin Corp.
(West) v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (post-dating Perry and stating that "(t] his
court... reviews the Board's interpretation of the FAR provisions incorporated into (the
contract] de nwo, with some deference afforded the Board's expertise in interpreting contract
regulations" (citing SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. v. United States, 900 F.2d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1990))).
566. 61 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
567. Aydin, 61 F.3d at 1577 ("To identify a constructive change, this court consults the
contract language.").
568. Id. at 1574. As described by the court, MUTES are "ground-based radar simulators
which evaluate airborne radar systems, test electronic warfare countermeasures systems, and train
pilots." Id.
569. Id. at 1577. The Progress Payments clause provided that "each progress payment shall
be computed as ... eighty percent (80%) of the contractor's cumulative total costs under this
contract." Id.
570. Id. at 1574-75.
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separate progress payment requests by delivery order.571 When the
contractor refused to alter its allocation and billing practice, the
contracting officer withheld progress payments and refused to resume
them until the directed change was made. 72 Aydin eventually made
the directed change, incurring significant administrative costs.
5 78
Consequently, Aydin submitted a request for an equitable adjustment,
but the request was denied by both the contracting officer and the
ASBCA.574 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, however, the court
concluded that the contracting officer constructively changed the
contract, entitling the contractor to an equitable adjustment.57
The Federal Circuit opined that the clear language in the "progress
payments" clause, "cumulative total costs under [the] contract,"
mandated the conclusion that the contractor was entitled to accumu-
late all delivery order costs and allocate them to the larger con-
tract.576  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the fact
that nothing in the Progress Payments clause directed Aydin to
segregate costs by delivery order, and that the Ordering clause of the
contract clearly distinguished between delivery orders and the overall
contract.57 7  Consequently, it was clear to the court that the lan-
guage of the Progress Payments clause referred to the MUTES
contract as a whole, and not to individual delivery orders.
Notably, the fact that the contractor treated the delivery orders as
separate contracts for performance purposes was irrelevant to the
court. 5 9 Furthermore, the court chastised the ASBCA for basing its
decision denying the equitable adjustment on a clause not expressly
nor impliedly contained in the Aydin contract.58




575. Id at 1578 (citingJ.B. Williams Co. v. United States, 450 F.2d 1379, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1971),
for proposition that Government has obligation to compensate contractor that is required to
proceed beyond its contractual obligation).
576. Id. at 1577.
577. Id.
578. ML
579. Id. at 1578.
580. Id. at 1577. The ASBCA had relied on FAR 32.503-5 ("Administration of Progress
Payments") to support its finding that each delivery order should be treated as a separate
contract. That regulation provides that "[g]enerally, the progress payments made under
multiple-order contracts should be administered under each individual order as if the order
constituted a separate contract." 48 C.F.R. § 32.503-5(c) (1) (1995). The Federal Circuit found
no evidence that 32.503-5 was contained in the instant contract and suggested that even if the
contract had relied on that provision, its inclusion would not have been outcome determinative
as the Board had suggested. Aydin, 61 F.3d at 1577 n.1.
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Aydin makes it clear that the contractor is entitled to an equitable
adjustment if the contracting officer requires the contractor to
implement an allocation or billing method change not otherwise
required by the terms of the contract. Furthermore, Aydin suggests
that the Federal Circuit prefers to confine its analysis to the express
terms of the contract and will not seriously entertain Government
arguments regarding implied terms or course of performance when
the contract requirements are clear on the face of the contract.
D. CAS Coverage and Foreign Sales Commissions in
CAS-covered Contracts
Aydin5 ' also presented the Federal Circuit with issues regarding
when a contract is covered by the CAS and how foreign sales
commissions are treated when the contract is CAS-covered. These
issues arose in the following context: Aydin sold an electronic system
called "SOLAR H" to the Argentine government in 1988, included the
resulting $3.7 million sales commission in its general and administra-
tive ("G&A") expense pool, and later allocated a portion of those
costs to the above-described MUTES contract. 2 The Defense
Contract Audit Agency ("DCAA"), operating under the assumption
that the contract was governed by the CAS, excluded the sales
commission from Aydin's G&A on the grounds that its inclusion
violated GAS 410 and 418.5"3 Aydin then sought to recover the
amount it would have received in progress payments from the
Government if the DCAA had not excluded the SOLAR II commission
from Aydin's G&A expense pool. However, the contractor's claim was
denied by both the contracting officer and the ASBCA.5"
Again operating under the assumption that the CAS applied to the
MUTES contract, the ASBCA excluded the SOLAR II foreign sales
commission from Aydin's G&A because: (1) the sales commissions
were not proper G&A expenses as defined in CAS 410;'1 (2) the
sales commissions were significant in size and thus could not
otherwise qualify as proper G&A expenses under the exception set
forth at CAS 510.50(C);.86 and (3) if included in G&A, the SOLAR
II sales commissions "would result in inequitable distribution of those
581. 61 F.Sd 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995).







commissions to Government contracts. "-87  Instead, the Board
concluded that the SOLAR II sales commission must be removed
from G&A and should be handled by "special allocation" as provided
in CAS 410.50(j). 5  Significantly, none of the other sales commis-
sions that had been included in G&A were of comparable size and
none were required to be removed from G&A.589 The Board finally
instructed Aydin to assign the sales commission directly to the SOLAR
II contract.59°
Before assessing the validity of the Board's decision with regard to
proper treatment of the SOLAR II sales commission under the CAS,
the Federal Circuit inquired whether the MUTES contract was, in fact,
covered by the CAS. The MUTES contract, described in the
preceding section, contained FAR 52.230-2, entitled "Cost Accounting
Standards."59' Pursuant to that clause, Aydin was required to
comply with all CAS in effect on the date of award unless it qualified
for one of several regulatory exceptions. 9 2 Specifically, the Federal
Circuit was faced with the question of whether the MUTES contract
was exempted from CAS coverage under GAS 331.30(b) (9) because
it was a firm fixed price contract awarded without the submission of
any cost data.593
CAS 331.30 (b) (9) exempts from CAS coverage "any firm fixed price
contract or subcontract awarded without submission of any cost data:
Provided, that the failure to submit such data is not attributable to a
waiver of the requirement for certified cost or pricing data."" 4
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that the MUTES contract
was not exempt from the GAS under 331.30(b) (9) because Aydin had
submitted informal cost information at the request of the contracting
officer prior to the contract award.595 This remained so despite the
fact that the contracting officer "sought this information to check for
mistakes or major omissions in offers, not to negotiate price." '596 To
support its expansive definition of "any cost data," the court stated:
The language of the regulation encompasses broadly "any cost
data." The modifier "any" sweeps all types of cost data within the
coverage of the regulation, including informal cost data. Moreover,
587. Id
588. 1& at 1576.
589. I& at 1575-76.
590. 1& at 1576.
591. Id at 1578.
592. Id
593. Id.
594. I& at 1578-79.
595. Id at 1579.
596. Id
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the appearance of the narrower phrase "cost and pricing data" later
in the regulation indicates that "cost data" covers more than the
"cost and pricing data" in negotiations. 97
The court also relied on the history of the promulgation of GAS
331.30(b) (9) to support its broad interpretation.59 s
Having determined that the MUTES contract was a GAS-covered
contract, the Federal Circuit addressed the validity of the Board's
decision to exclude the $3.7 million SOLAR II foreign sales commis-
sion from G&A. Of central concern to the court was whether the
Board, in ordering a change in Aydin's cost accounting principles,
had violated CAS 402.59
Contractors operating under a CAS-covered contract are required,
by GAS 402, to employ consistent accounting practices when
classifying similar costs as direct or indirect."° Finding first that
there was "no distinction between the SOLAR II sales commission
costs and Aydin's sales commission costs other than dollar
amount,""°1 the court concluded that the Government violated CAS
402 when it determined that Aydin could retain all sales commissions
other than the SOLAR II commission in its G&A pool.
°2
Specifically, the court stated that "the Government may not define
'costs' so narrowly [when construing the GAS] as to capture only one
isolated cost item, even where that cost item is disproportionately
large.""°  Significantly, this statement was not without limit. The
court noted that a foreign sales commission incurred under "different
circumstances" or for purposes other than foreign sales commissions
may not have violated CAS 402.60' Accordingly, the court remanded
the case to the ASBCA for a determination of whether any of those
circumstances were present in the instant case.'
Aydin appears to take as much as it gives. On the one hand, the
Federal Circuit appears to side with the contractor in this case by
requiring the Government to play by its own rules and treat costs
consistently, as envisioned by the GAS. Even that premise, however,
is somewhat tempered by the court's observation that in certain









605. Id. For the subsequent history of this case, see Aydin Corp (West), ASBCA No. 42760,
96-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 28,134 (1996).
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significantly, this decision provides contractors with a bevy of new
situations that may cause the CAS to become applicable to their fixed-
price contracts.
E. Independent Research and Development Costs Not Depreciable
Under GAAP
Independent research and development ("IR&D") costs are defined
by the FAR as costs associated with projects involving basic research,
applied research, development, or systems and other concept-
formulation studies. 6 IR&D does not include the costs of efforts
sponsored by a grant, costs required in the performance of a contract,
or costs expended in preparing data specifically to support submitting
a bid or proposal. °7
When a government contract contains FAR 31.205-18(d), °8 IR&D
costs generally are not depreciable and must be expensed in the year
that they are incurred.0 9 When the contract does not contain FAR
31.205-18(d) and the contract is governed by generally accepted
accounting principles ("GAAP"), IR&D costs remain non-depreciable
and also must be expensed in the year that they are incurred. 1 °
This latter rule was applied by the Federal Circuit in 1995 in
Aydin.11 In that case, Aydin entered into a Research and Develop-
ment Partnership with a private party to develop a three-dimensional
radar system. When the funding for research and development
ran out, Aydin built the system with its own funds during 1986 and
1987.613 Aydin then treated the system as a capital asset and depre-
606. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-18(a) (1995).
607. IMt
608. FAR § 31.205-18(d) provides in pertinent part:
(1) IER&D costs that were incurred in previous accounting periods are unallowable,
except when a contractor has developed a specific product at its own risk in
anticipation of recovering the development costs in the sale price of the product
provided that-
(i) The total amount of IR&D costs applicable to the product can be identified;
(ii) The proration of such costs to sales of the product is reasonable;
(iii) The contractor had no Government business during the time that the costs
were incurred or did not allocate IR&D costs to Government contracts except to
prorate the cost of developing a specific product to the sales of that product; and
(iv) No costs of current IR&D programs are allocated to Government work except
to prorate the costs of developing a specific product to the sales of that product.
48 C.F.R. § 31.205-18(d).
609. 1d
610. Aydin Corp. (West) v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Denro, Inc.
v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 270, 278 n.14 (1990)).
611. 61 F.Sd 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
612. Id. at 1576.
613. Id.
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ciated its costs over a five year period.614 The depreciated costs
were included in Aydin's 1988 G&A expense pool, and a portion of
those costs were allocated to the aforementioned MUTES con-
tract.615 The DCCA challenged Aydin's treatment of the radar
system costs, maintaining that the costs were IR&D costs, which, under
FAR 31.205-18(d) (1), must be expensed in the years that they were
incurred.616 Accordingly, DCAA disallowed the radar system costs
and excluded them from Aydin's 1988 G&A expense pool.617 Both
the contracting officer and the ASBCA denied Aydin's request for full
reimbursement.
618
Without significant discussion, the Federal Circuit affirmed that the
costs were IR&D costs." 9 Although it ultimately determined that
the IR&D costs were not depreciable, the court did not rest this
determination on FAR 31.205-18(d) (1).62 °  Because the contract
between Aydin and the Government did not expressly incorporate
FAR 31.205-18(d) (1), the court held that the ASBCA erred when it
relied on that provision to exclude IR&D from the 1988 G&A
pool.62  However, because the contract expressly incorporated
GAAP,622 and GAAP precludes depreciation of IR&D costs,62 the
costs remained non-depreciable.624
Although Aydin does very little to clarify what constitutes IR&D
costs, the case is significant for at least two reasons. First, Aydin sets
forth the GAAP rule regarding depreciation of IR&D costs, that is,
IR&D costs are not depreciable and must be expensed in the year that
they are incurred.6" Second, Aydin is significant because it reiter-
ates the extremely important principle that the Government and the
boards of contract appeals are not free to read into contracts
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. Id.; see 48 C.F.IL § 31.205-18(d)(1) (1995).
617. Aydin, 61 F.3d at 1576.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 1580.
620. Id. at 1580 n.2.
621. Id.
622. The contract between Aydin and the Government contained FAR 52.232-16, which
provides that "'[t]he Contractor shall not include the following in total costs for progress
payment purposes...
(i) Costs that are not reasonable, allocable to this contract, and consistent with sound and
generally accepted accounting principles and practices.'" Id. at 1580 (quoting 48 C.F.R.
§ 52.232-16 (1995)).
623. Id. (citing Denro, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 270, 278 n.14 (1990)).
624. Id. at 1580-81.
625. Id.
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nonmandatory FAR clauses that the Government has omitted by
mistake.626
1 A Final Note on Aydin
The Aydin appeal to the Federal Circuit involved one final claim.
In 1988 and 1989, Aydin settled two claims it had with the Govern-
ment and received more than $4.7 million for unabsorbed overhead
costs. 627 Following payment, the contracting officer deducted $1.6
million and $2.8 million from Aydin's indirect cost pools to offset the
unabsorbed overhead already recovered.62 8  Aydin challenged the
corresponding reductions in its progress payments, 629 but both the
contracting officer and the ASBCA denied its claim for reimburse-
ment 6  The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the Board's
decision stating simply that "Aydin cannot recoup indirectly what the
Government has already paid it directly.""
G. Entitlement to Eichleay Formula Damages Clarified
The Eichleay formula is a method63 2 of calculating a contractor's
damages for unabsorbed overhead when the Government delays
contract performance, the contractor is required to "stand by" ready
to perform, and the contractor is unable to take on any additional
work during the period of delay.633 The Federal Circuit adopted
the Eichleay formula as the exclusive means for calculating unabsorbed
home office overhead in a 1994 case, Wickham Contracting Co. v.
Fischer,6 after a lengthy battle over the proper method of calculat-
626. Cf G.L. Christian &Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, rehgdenied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct.
CI.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963) (holding that government contract regulations created
under statutory authority will have force and effect of law, even though not included in terms
of particular contract).
627. Aydin, 61 F.3d at 1576-77.
628. Id. at 1577.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 1581.
632. The formula "estimates unabsorbed overhead by determining a daily overhead dollar
amount for a particular contract and multiplying that amount by the number of days of delay."
Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d 883, 886 (citing Eichleay Corp., ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 B.CA
(CCH) 1 2688, affd on reconsid., 61-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 2894).
633. See Eichleay Corp., ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 2688 (1960) (deriving
method for allocation of continuing expenses between company overhead and government
contract cost), aff'd on reconsideration, 61-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 2894 (1961).
634. 12 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The court in Wickham stated:
[B]ecause it is impossible to determine the amount of unabsorbed overhead caused
by the delay of any particular contract, and because the Eichleay formula provides an
equitable method of compensating a contractor for unabsorbed overhead without
costing taxpayers more than they should pay, we hold that the Eichleay formula is the
exclusive means for compensating a contractor for unabsorbed overhead when it
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ing such damages. In 1995, the Federal Circuit in Mech-Con Corp. v.
West6' clarified the circumstances under which the Eichleay formula
may be applied properly by establishing that when the length of the
Government-imposed delay is uncertain, the contractor need prove
only the first two predicate facts to entitlement-Government-imposed
delay and "standby"-to shift the burden to the Government to show
that the contractor could have accepted additional work to absorb the
overhead costs.
6 6
Mech-Con had contracted to upgrade the fire alarm system at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia. 3 The contract provided that the Government
would install the transmission lines for the upgraded system.6s
Mech-Con completed all the work that could be done without the
updated transmission lines. 9 After being informed by the Govern-
ment that the transmission lines would not be forthcoming soon, the
contractor left the job site.' Two hundred-eighty-nine days later,
the Government instructed Mech-Con to complete the contract
without the specified transmission lines."'
Following contract completion, Mech-Con filed a properly certified
claim for an equitable adjustment for unabsorbed home office
overhead costs during the delay period.' When the contracting
officer and the ASBCA denied its claim, Mech-Con appealed to the
Federal Circuit.' The contractor's argument for entitlement rested
solely on the following joint stipulation entered into by the parties:
"The suspension of work from July 9, 1985, through April 23, 1986,
otherwise meets the Eichisay prerequisites.
Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994). But see Charles E.
Raley, TheEichleay Bandwagon: Should We Pause BorejumpingAboard? 31-2 THE PROCUREMENT
LAWYF 3 (1996) (challenging exclusive use of Eichleay formula damages).
For a discussion of the history leading to Wickham, see Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc.
v. West, 12 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (establishing three-prong test for determining
whether unabsorbed overhead costs are recoverable using Eichleay formula); Daly Constr., Inc.
v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520, 552 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting application of Eichleay formula when
contractor did not show that it could not take on additional work); Community Heating &
Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting application of
Eichleay formula when no suspension of performance occurred); C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United
States, 978 F.2d 669, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that for Eichleay formula to be used,
contractor must be on stand-by and be unable to take other work).
635. 61 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
636. Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1995).





642. Id. Mech-Con calculated its total unabsorbed overhead to be $60,847.50 under the
Eichleay formula. Id.
643. Id. at 884-85. The Board's decision is at Mech-Con Corp., ASBCA No. 45105, 94-3
B.C.A. (CCH) 1 27,252.
1724
GOVERNMENT CONTRACr CASES
[289 days] was unexpected, and Mech-Con did not know how long it
would last. Mech-Con had to stand ready to return, install equip-
ment, make final connections, and maintain a presence for the testing
by [its subcontractor]."'
In the litigation before the Board, the Government prevailed
because Mech-Con failed to prove that the Government's delay
precluded Mech-Con from taking on other work during the delay
period.' On appeal, the Government reiterated its contention that
Mech-Con had the burden of proof with regard to this element of
entitlement.' Additionally, the Government pointed to the
relatively small amount of work remaining as evidence that Mech-Con
was not precluded from finding additional work. 7
The Federal Circuit rejected the Government's argument.
Recognizing the "impracticality of a contractor obtaining replacement
work or reducing home office overhead when it must 'standby' during
an 'uncertain' period of government imposed delay,"' the court
concluded that the joint stipulation averred a prima facie case for
application of the Eichleay formula. 9  Furthermore, because the
Government did little more than point to the amount of work
remaining, the court held that the Government did not meet its
burden to show that Mech-Con was able to take on more work:
Eichleay formula damages are awarded because a government-
imposed delay prevents the contractor from allocating its resources
to a new project. The amount of work remaining on a suspended
contract is essentially irrelevant if a contractor must leave its
resources idle in order to complete that work on short notice. In
view of stipulations ... establishing (i) that Mech-Con was on
standby, (ii) that it was a small company whose "home office staff
could not be affectively [sic] reduced during the indefinite
suspension period," and (iii) that it had limited bonding capacity,
we are not prepared to say that the government rebutted Mech-
Con's prima facie case of entitlement to Eichleay formula damages
simply by pointing to the fact that little work remained to be
done.6 0
644. Mech-Con, 61 F.3d at 884-85 (quotingJoint Stipulation of Facts, at 20).
645. Id. at 885. The Board also discounted the Joint Stipulation and concluded that Mech-
Con failed to establish that it had stood ready to return on short notice. Id
646. Id. at 887.
647. IM
648. Id. (citations omitted).
649. Id. at 886. The Federal Circuit, unlike the ASBCA, gave full weight to the Joint
Stipulation when the Government did not contest the accuracy of the Joint Stipulation, nor was
the Stipulation contrary to the record. Id. at 887.
650. Id.
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Significantly, the court observed that the amount remaining could be
relevant in a case in which the contractor did not have to leave its
resources idle.651
Notably, the court in Mech-Con refused to grant Eichleay formula
damages to the contractor for the period of time between the
Government's order to resume work and the contractor's
remobilization, 2 because the contractor took more than three
months to return to the site, thereby undercutting the "standby"
element of entitlement.
653
The most significant aspect of the Mech-Con decision is its holding
that when the Government places a contractor on standby for an
uncertain duration, the Government will be required to show lack of
harm to the contractor or pay Eichleay formula damages.'M Conse-
quently, it is probable that future litigation will center around the
level of proof required for the Government to rebut successfully a
prima facie showing of Eichleay's application.
H. Research Tax Credit Applicable to Fixed Price Contract
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981655 established a research
tax credit to provide an incentive to American industry to invest in
research." 5 In 1995, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the tax credit would be applicable to research performed
under a government procurement contract in Fairchild Industries v.
United States.
657
The provision at issue "provides a tax credit of increased research
expenditures compared with a baseline measured by the previous
three years' research expenditures."' The tax credit, however, is
not applicable to research costs "to the extent funded by any grant,
contract, or otherwise by another person (or any governmental
entity)."659 At first glance this would seem to exclude research
651. Id at 887 n.4.
652. 1I at 887.
653. Id.
654. The following cases recently have applied the Mech.Con interpretation of Eichkeay.
Sippial Elec. & Constr. Co. v. Widnall, 69 F.3d 555 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-1276,
1995 WL 646344 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 1995); Satellite Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 46935, 95-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 1 27,883 (1995); C.E.R., Inc., ASBCA No. 41767, 96-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 28,029 (1995).
655. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1994))
(amending Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to encourage economic growth through variety of
taxation measures).
656. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 30).
657. 71 F.3d 868 (Fed. Cir. 1995).




conducted pursuant to the terms of a government procurement
contract. Applicable Treasury Regulations, however, set forth the
criterion for "funded" as whether payment for the research is
"contingent on [its] success."660 It was on this language that Fair-
child Industries tuned.
Fairchild entered into a fixed-price incentive contract with the Air
Force in 1982, in which Fairchild was to design and produce T-46A
training aircraft. The contract required a full-scale development
("FSD") phase and a production phase.662 The contract ultimately
was terminated for government convenience after the program was
cancelled by Congress in late 1986.6 By that time, Fairchild
already had spent $216,056,000 during its FSD phase.6 8 The tax
credit related solely to the FSD phase, and on its 1982-85 tax returns,
Fairchild reported a total of $109.4 million of research expenses
related to that phase of the contract 6' The Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") disallowed approximately $19.6 million for reasons
unrelated to the appeal before the court6 and disallowed 55.8%,
or $50.3 million, as having been "funded" within the meaning of
§ 44F(d) (3).66 The 55.8% figure represented the ratio of the FSD
costs the Air Force ultimately paid ($120.6 million) to Fairchild's total
FSD costs ($216.1 million).68 As a consequence, the IRS disallowed
$5.8 million in research tax credits claimed by Fairchild for the 1983
and 1984 tax years.669 The Court of Federal Claims held that
because Fairchild "did not itself incur" the research expenses, as the
expenses were "funded" by the Government, it was not entitled to the
tax credit. Whether this was the correct result was the issue
before the Federal Circuit
6 11
Fairchild argued "that the Air Force 'funded' no part of the
research because Fairchild's right to payment was 'contingent on the
success of the research' within the text and intent of the statute and
Treasury Regulation § 1.41-5(d) (1)."62 It is a characteristic of most
660. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.41-5(d) (1) (1995)).
661. Id. at 870.
662. Id. at 870-71.






669. Id at 871-72.
670. Fairchild Indus. v. United States, 30 Fed. CL. 839, 850-51 (1994).
671. Fairchild Indus., 71 F.3d at 869.
672. Id. at 872.
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government contracts that successful performance is a prerequisite to
payment." This applies even to contracts such as Fairchild's, in
which performance has been funded partially by progress payments,
because the contractor is obliged to repay the progress payments if it
fails to perform. 4 In its decision, the Federal Circuit examined the
provisions of Fairchild's contract with the Air Force in order to show
that the Air Force was obligated to pay for the research only if
Fairchild produced results that met the contract specifications.
6 7 5
Reversing the Court of Federal Claims, the Federal Circuit held:
Treasury regulation § 1.41-5 (d) (1) provides that for the researcher
to claim the credit, the amounts payable under the agreement must
be contingent on success. The inquiry turned on who bears the
research costs upon failure, not on whether the researcher is likely
to succeed in performing the project. When payment is contingent
on performance, such as the successful research and development
of a new product or process, the researcher bears the risk of failure.
Whatever risk Fairchild was bearing, the Air Force bore none of it,
for the Air Force was liable for payment only when the work, line
item by item, succeeded and was accepted. 76
V. THE SOVEREIGN ACTS DOCTRINE
The sovereign acts doctrine shields the Government as a contract-
ing party from liability for breach of its contractual obligations when
its actions as sovereign interfere with or abrogate the terms of a
government contract. 7 Thus, when legislation or executive action
interferes with an existing government contract, the Government will
be liable for breach unless the legislative or executive act is a
"sovereign" act.678
673. See 48 C.F.R. § 252.217-7007(e) (1995) ("Upon completion of the work under a job
order and final inspection and acceptance, and upon submission of invoices in such form and
with such copies as the Contracting Officer may prescribe, the Contractor shall be paid for the
price of the job order. .. ").
674. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-16(b) (1995) ("The Contractor shall repay to the Government
any amounts required by a retroactive price reduction, after computing liquidations and
payments on past invoices at the reduced prices and adjusting the unliquidated progress
payments accordingly.").
675. Fairchild Indus., 71 F.3d. at 870-71.
676. Id. at 872.
677. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953, 958 (Fed. Cir.
1993). For an excellent discussion of the sovereign acts doctrine, see Horowitz v. United States,
267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925), and Adas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
678. Thermalon Indus., Ltd. v. United States, No. 94-1078C, 1995 WL 650677, at *8 (Fed.
Cl. Nov. 6, 1995).
1728
1996] GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CASES 1729
To qualify as "sovereign," the governmental act must be both
"public and general."679 When these criteria are satisfied, govern-
ment liability will not arise."0 The Government, however, will
remain liable under the contract despite the sovereign nature of its
actions when the contract expressly shifts the risk of such action to
the Government.68'
In 1995, the Federal Circuit was faced with a sovereign acts defense
of monumental proportion in Winstar Corp. v. United States.682 The
Winstardecision cannot be analyzed properly without a brief recitation
of both the history of the federal savings and loan industry and the
procedural history of the case.
Following the Great Depression of the 1930s, Congress implement-
ed several programs designed to revive failing thrift institutions and
to restore public confidence in federal savings and loan associa-
tions.' For example, Congress created and authorized the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board ("Bank Board") to charter and regulate
federal savings and loan associations.' Federal deposit insurance
also was established, and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation ("FSLIC") was created to regulate all federally insured
thrifts.' Integral to the new regulatory scheme was the require-
ment that thrifts maintain minimal reserves of capital. 6 Failure to
meet capital adequacy requirements has serious repercussions:
679. Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc. v. Widnall, 51 F.3d 258, 262 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The
United States when sued as contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the
performance of the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as sovereign.")
(citing Horoaitz, 267 U.S. at 461). Or/ando Helcpter provides an example of an executive
sovereign act. In that case, a contractor was barred from recovering costs incurred in
connection with a criminal investigation not initiated by the contracting officer because "the
government's... police powers ... are an ancient and fundamental indicia of sovereignty." I'd
at 262; see Walter Dawgie Ski Corp. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 115, 134 (1995) (holding that
construction of federal highway on federal land was sovereign act).
680. For a recent case finding that a government act was not sufficiently "public or general"
and holding the Government liable for breach of contract, see Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 33 Fed. Cl. 196, 210 (1995); see also Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 817 (Ct.
Cl. 1978) (holding Government liable for breach when its actions were "directed principally and
primarily at plaintiffi' contractual right"); Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723,
731 (1981) (holding Government liable for breach when it unilaterally "terminated one contract
after deciding continued performance would have been unwise").
681. Hughes Communications Galaxy, 998 F.2d at 958. The court in Hughes stated: "Because
we conclude that the contract shifts responsibility to the government for changes in policy which
conflict with the provisions of Article IV [of the contract], we offer no opinion about the
presidential actions as they might pertain to the sovereign act doctrine." Id. at 958 n.8.
682. 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
683. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
684. Id at 1535; see Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1994)).
685. Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1535 (discussing National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479,
48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (1994))).
686. I&
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noncomplying thrifts can be seized, placed into receivership, and later
sold or liquidated. 7
When the prime interest rate rose in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
the federal savings and loan industry faced a new crisis.' The
thrifts' main assets were long-term, fixed-rate mortgages acquired
during an era of low interest rates. 9 The revenues produced by
these mortgages were slight in comparison to the rising costs of
attracting short-term deposits, making it difficult for thrifts to meet
their deposit obligations."9 Rather than seizing and liquidating all
of the failing thrifts-actions that would exhaust the federal deposit
insurance fund established under the 1930s legislation-the Govern-
ment implemented policy changes encouraging healthy thrifts to
acquire failing ones.691 Encouragement took the form of two
incentives: "supervisory goodwill" and "capital credits."692
The supervisory goodwill incentive operated as follows: following
a merger between the healthy and failing thrift, the healthy thrift
could count toward its minimum capital requirement the difference
between the fair market value of the failing thrift's liabilities and the
fair market value of the failing thrift's assets.693 In addition, supervi-
sory goodwill could be amortized over periods of up to forty
years.694  The second incentive, capital credits, provided for a
federal cash contribution to the merged thrift that could also be
counted toward the minimum capital requirement.
695
At least three healthy thrifts (including Winstar, Statesman, and
Glendale) took advantage of this special accounting treatment and,
after substantial negotiation with the Bank Board and FSLIC, agreed
to acquire failing thrifts with government approval.696 Despite the
fact that mergers such as these probably saved the Government
millions of dollars,697 the federal savings and loan industry contin-
ued to falter.698






693. Id. at 1536.
694. Id.
695. IMt
696. See id. at 1536-38.
697. 1&. at 1536. If the failing thrifts had been liquidated rather than acquired, the
Government would have been forced to pay the insured depositors. Id
698. Md. at 1538.
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Attempting again to restore the industry, Congress enacted the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA")." While FIRREA made substantial changes to the
overall regulatory scheme,' ° it specifically restricted the use of
supervisory goodwill as a means of meeting new capital require-
ments. °' In addition, the newly created Office of Thrift Supervision
issued regulations under FIRREA that imposed the same limitation on
the use of capital credits.0 2 Without the continued availability of
this special accounting treatment, the merged thrifts quickly fell into
noncompliance with Government-mandated capital adequacy
requirements.
70 3
In three suits before the Court of Federal Claims 4 between 1990
and 1992, Winstar, Statesman, and Glendale successfilly argued that
the United States had a contractual obligation to recognize superviso-
ry goodwill and capital credits, and that FIRREA and its implementing
regulations breached this obligation. °'
After reviewing documentation generated by the respective merger
transactions, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that supervisory
goodwill and capital credits were explicit terms in enforceable
contracts. 7 6 The fact that FIRREA and its implementing regulations
699. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
700. Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1538 (outlining FIRREA-imposed organizational changes).
701. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (1994). Sections 1464(t) (3) (A) and 1464(t) (9) (B) limit the amount
of amortized goodwill and the length of time for amortizing supervisory goodwill. Id.
702. See 12 C.F.R. § 567.1(w) (1995).
703. See Winstar, 64 F.3d at 538-39 (discussing failure and seizure of thrifts that did not satisfy
new capital standards).
704. The parties filed suit in the Claims Court. In 1992, this court was renamed the United
States Court of Federal Claims. Pub. L. No. 102-572, tit. IX, §§ 902(a), 903(b), 102 Stat. 4516,
4517 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C § 171 (c) (1994)).
705. See Statesman Sav. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904, 915 (1992) (holding
that Government was contractually obligated to permit financial institutions to use purchase
method and that Government breached its contract by prohibiting such use); Winstar Corp. v.
United States, 25 CL. Ct. 541, 549 (1992) (finding that binding contract existed between Govern-
ment and plaintiffs and that Government breached contract when Congress enacted FIRREA);
Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112, 117 (1990) (holding that implied-in-fact contract
was created by Government's promise that corporations could treat "supervisory goodwill" as
capital asset and amortize it over 35 years). The Glendale case was consolidated and decided with
Statesman. The Court of Federal Claims did not reach the thrifts' alternative argument that the
Government violated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause in any of these cases. Winstar, 64
F.3d at 1539.
706. Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1539. Based on its review of Statesman's Assistance Agreement and
various other documents, the court concluded that Statesman had an express contract with the
Government. Statesman Say. Holding Corp., 26 Cl. Ct. at 912. Similarly, the court found that the
Supervisory Action Agreement and various other documents constituted an express contract
between Glendale and the Government. Id. at 912. By contrast, the documentation available
in Winstar led the court to conclude that an implied-in-fact contract arose. Winstar, 21 Cl. Ct.
at 114-15. The court rejected the Government's assertion that the documents were merely
statements of then-existing regulatory policy and bound the Government to the representations
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mandated abrogation of supervisory goodwill and capital credits
caused the Government to breach the terms of the merger agree-
ments. 7 The court found that FIRREA's end result was to "tak[e]
away plaintiffs' right"78 to use supervisory goodwill, and that the
legislation, therefore, could not be considered "public and general."
Thus, the sovereign acts doctrine could not shield the Government
from breach.7°
The Government countered with an unmistakability argument
Relying on Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrap-
ment,710 the Government argued that the instant contracts restricted
congressional legislative authority, and that such a restriction was
impermissible absent an unmistakable government waiver of that
right.71' The consequence, according to the Government, was that
"no contract rights existed between the parties."712
The court flatly rejected the Government's argument that the
power of Congress to legislate was at issue when the contractors
sought only monetary damages for breach of contract.'1 Distin-
guishing breach of contract cases from cases in which the plaintiffs
seek injunctive relief, the Court reasoned that the unmistakability
doctrine was inapposite, stating:
It is critical to this case... that plaintiffs are not claiming that the
government contractually bound Congress not to change its regula-
tions. Rather, plaintiffs claim that in their particular transaction
with the government, it was agreed that they would be permitted to
treat supervisory goodwill in a particular way for a fixed number of
years. Thus, while Congress' power to regulate is not impaired, the
government may be compelled to pay for the results of its actions,
especially when in so doing the government actually is paying
because it received a benefit.
714
The three Court of Federal Claims decisions were consolidated for
interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit.7 5  Conceding that it
had afforded the thrifts special accounting treatment in the past, the
Government contested the lower court's finding that enforceable
made therein. Id at 115.
707. Winstar, 25 Cl. Ct. at 549.
708. Id at 552.
709. Id. at 553.
710. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
711. Winstar, 25 Cl. Ct. at 543-44; see Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec.
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51-55 (1986).
712. Winstar, 25 Cl. Ct. at 543.
713. Il at 545 n.7 (holding that Government can be liable for monetary damages).
714. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112, 116 (1990).
715. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797 (1993), vacated and withdrawn and reh k in
bane granted, 64 F.3d 1531 (1995).
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contracts bound the Government to continue to afford such special
accounting treatment in the future. 16
Reversing the Court of Federal Claims in a panel decision, the
Federal Circuit held that the Government was shielded from contrac-
tual liability under the sovereign acts doctrine.717 Stating that
FIRREA was a "generally applicabl[e]" statute enacted for the "public
good, 7 11 the court rejected the lower court's finding that the statute
"singled out [the plaintiffs] as targets. 7 11 Instead, the court found
that FIRREA was squarely within the bounds of a sovereign act. After
citing to numerous congressional reports suggesting that the thrift
crisis was caused by the "'utilization of capital gimmicks,' 72 ° the
court stated that "[t]he accounting methods which had been
approved were disapproved for all of the industry because of the
perceived harm to the public."2" The fact that many merged thrifts
survived the changes imposed by FIRREA also influenced the court's
conclusion. 722  In addition, the majority panel endorsed the
Government's unmistakability argument.7' By order of August 18,
1993, however, the panel decision was vacated and withdrawn, and
rehearing in banc was granted.2
In a 9-2 vote, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court
of Federal Claims.7' The court concluded that each thrift had an
express contractual right to special accounting treatment and that
those contractual rights were abrogated by FIRREA and its implement-
ing regulations.2 6
The Government's sovereign act defense was rejected on the
ground that FIRREA was not a "general or public" act. Because the
court determined that the statute "plainly singles out supervisory
goodwill for special treatment," it followed that the thrifts that
716. Id. at 807. The Government also reiterated its alternative argument that the
unmistakability doctrine barred government liability for the subsequent change in terms. Id. at
809.
717. See id. at 807-08 (concluding that FIRREA legislation falls within ambit of sovereign acts
doctrine).
718. I at 808.
719. Id. at 809 (finding that accounting methods were disapproved for entire industry).
720. Id. at 808-09 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 310 (1989),
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C..N. 86, 106).
721. Id. at 809.
722. Id.
723. Id. at 809-10.
724. Id. at 819.
725. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
726. Id. at 1540-45. The Federal Circuit did not reach the issue of whether Vimstar had an
implied-in-fact contract because it found that an express contract arose. Id. at 1543.
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underwent supervisory mergers were targeted by the statute.7 27 The
court stated:
We accept, as did the Court of Federal Claims, that FIRREA was
enacted for the public welfare-presumably all legislation is. We
are convinced, however, that the FIRREA provisions at issue here
targeted thrifts that had undergone supervisory mergers, financed
in part with supervisory goodwill, with the approval and assistance
of the federal government.... The government has plainly sought
to render its own performance impossible. This is not a public and
general act. The sovereign acts doctrine does not apply.7 2'
This determination was supported by examination of FIRREA's
legislative history2 9 and was not undermined by the fact that the
particular provisions abrogating the special accounting treatment were
part of comprehensive legislation."' Finally, the court, sitting in
banc, adopted the Court of Federal Claims' reasoning to reject
application of the unmistakability doctrine in breach of contract
cases.
731
The Department of Justice sought a writ of certiorari that was
granted in January 1996.2 On July 1, 1996, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit in a 7-2 decision and
remanded the case to the Court of Federal Claims for determination
727. Id. at 1549.
728. Id. at 1550-51.
729. Id at 1550. The court reproduced the following statements made by members of the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Foreign Affhirs in response to the House version
of FIRREA.
"Unfortunately, [FIRREA] was amended by the Full Committee to phase out the
treatment of goodwill for capital purposes over a five year period. Simply put, the
Committee has reneged on the agreements that the government entered into
concerning supervisory goodwill.
... Clearly, the agreements concerning the treatment of goodwill were part of what
the institutions had bargained for. Just as clearly, the committee is abrogating those
agreements.-
Id. (quoting H.. REP. No. 54, supra note 720, at 498, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CAN. at 293-94).
730. In dissent, Circuit Judge Lourie argued that the majority's focus on the supervisory
goodwill provisions "mischaracterize[d] the true nature of the governmental action." Id. at 1552
(Lourie, J., dissenting).
731. The decision made it clear that the unmistakability doctrine is applicable only "when
a party asserts that the Government has waived its right to exercise a sovereign power and seeks
to enforce that right through an injunction or a declaration that a statute is unconstitutional."
Clarence T. Kipps,Jr. & Kevin C. Dwyer, Winstar Confirms the Limits on the Government's Ability to
Avoid Liability When It Reneges on Its Contracts, 64 FED. CONT. REP. (Special Supp.) 3, 14 (1995).
According to the Winstar majority. "Congress was always free to deem supervisory goodwill a bad
idea and legislate it out of existence. Where that legislation breached the Government's prior
contractual obligations regarding the treatment of supervisory goodwill, however, the
Government remains liable in money damages for breach." Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1548.
732. 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
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of the appropriate measure and amount of damages.88 Like the
lower courts before it, the Supreme Court initiated its analysis by
reviewing "the relevant documents and circumstances ... [and]
applying ordinary principles of contract construction and breach that
would be applicable to any contract action between private par-
ties. 7 M The Court accepted the Federal Circuit's conclusion that
"the government breached these contracts when, pursuant to the new
regulatory capital requirements imposed by FIRREA. . . the federal
regulatory agencies limited the use of supervisory goodwill and capital
credits in calculating [the thrifts'] net worth."
7 5
The Court then evaluated the Government's unmistakability and
sovereign act defenses to breach. With regard to the former, the
Court stated:
[The Government's] argument mistakes the scope of the
unmistakability doctrine. The thrifts do not claim that the Bank
Board and FSLIC purported to bind Congress to ossify the law in
conformity to the contracts; they seek no injunction against applica-
tion of FIRREA's new capital requirements to them and no
exemption from FIRREA's terms. They simply claim that the
Government assumed the risk that subsequent changes in the law
might prevent it from performing, and agreed to pay damages in
the event that such failure to perform caused financial injury. The
question, then, is not whether Congress could be constrained but
whether the doctrine of unmistakability is applicable to any contract
claim against the Government for breach occasioned by a subse-
quent act of Congress. The answer to this question is no.73'
After a lengthy discussion of applicable precedent,78 7 the Court
found that application of the unmistakability doctrine turns not on
the particular remedy sought,7' but rather "on whether enforce-
ment of the contractual obligation alleged would block the exercise
of a sovereign power of the Government."8 9
733. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996). Justice Souter penned the majority decision,joined byjusdices
Stevens, Breyer, and O'Connor (in part). Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia (joined by justices
Kennedy and Thomas) filed separate concurring opinions. ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice
Ginsberg dissented.
734. Id. at 2453.
735. 1& at 2452-53.
736. Id. at 2453.
737. Among other cases, the Court discussed United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,
480 U.S. 700 (1987); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41
(1986); and Merrion v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at
2455-57.
738. Id. at 2457.
739. Id. at 2456.
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[A]pplication of the doctrine will ... differ according to the
different kinds of obligations the Government may assume and the
consequences of enforcing them. At one end of the wide spectrum
are claims for enforcement of contractual obligations that could not
be recognized without effectively limiting sovereign authority, such
as a claim for rebate under an agreement for a tax exemption.
Granting a rebate, like enjoining enforcement, would simply block
the exercise of taxing power.., and the unmistakability doctrine
would have to be satisfied. At the other end are contracts, say, to
buy food for the army; no sovereign power is limited by the
Government's promise to purchase and a claim for damages implies
no such limitation. That is why no one would seriously contend
that enforcement of humdrum supply contracts might be subject to
the unmistakability doctrine. Between these extremes lies an
enormous variety of contracts including those under which
performance will require exercise (or not) of a power peculiar to
the Government. So long as such a contract is reasonably construed to
include a risk-shifting component that may be enforced without effectively
barring the exerise of that power, the enforcement of the risk allocation
raises nothing for the unmistakability doctrine to guard against, and there
is no reason to apply it.740
Ultimately, because the thrifts' contracts did not prevent Congress
from enacting regulatory measures, did not seek an injunction against
the application of the law to them, and included a risk-shifting component
(insuring the thrifts against any losses arising from future regulatory change)
that could be enforced without an effective bar of governmental power, the
unmistakability doctrine did not apply.741  Anticipating the
Government's argument that the cost of a subsequent regulatory
change could be construed as an indirect impediment to the exercise
of sovereign power, the Court stated:
[A] 11 regulations have their costs, and Congress itself expressed a
willingness to bear the costs at issue when it first authorized FSLIC
to 'guarantee [acquiring thrifts] against loss' that might occur as a
result of a supervisory merger.... [Wie must reject the suggestion
that the Government may simply shift costs of legislation onto its
contractual partners who are adversely affected by the change in
740. Id at 2457-58 (emphasis added).
741. Id. at 2458. The Court found:
The Bank Board resolutions, Forbearance Letters, and other documents setting forth
the accounting treatment to be accorded supervisory goodwill generated by the
transactions were not mere statements of then-current regulatory policy, but in each
instance were terms in an allocation of risk of regulatory change that was essential to




the law, when the Government has assumed the risk of such
change.742
The Court also viewed its refusal to accept the Government's
unmistakability defense as consistent with the Government's own long-
run interest, because "[ilnjecting the opportunity for unmistakability
litigation into every common contract action would ... produce the
untoward result of compromising the Government's practical capacity
to make contracts, which we have held to be 'of the essence of
sovereignty' itself."7'
The Court also rejected the Government's sovereign acts defense.
With regard to the "public and general" nature of FIRREA, the Court
disputed the Government's contention that FIRREA was enacted
solely in the Government's regulatory capacity.7' Noting that it is
difficult to draw "a workable line ... between the Government's
'regulatory' and 'nonregulatory' capacities,"' the Court suggested
that FIRREA was enacted, at least in part, to protect the Government
as private insurer." Moreover, because the Court was concerned
with the Government's ability to label its acts as "regulatory" to avoid
its contractual liabilities,747 the Court established that "a governmen-
tal act will not be public and general if it has the substantial effect of
releasing the Government from its contractual obligations."7' The
Court then concluded that the enactment of FIRREA was not a public
or general act because it had a "substantial effect" on government
contracts and it specifically eliminated the very accounting gimmicks
that the acquiring thrifts had been promised. 49
The Court continued by observing that even if FIRREA could
qualify as a "public and general" act, it did not follow automatically
that the Government would be relieved from liability. The Court
stated:
[Because] the object of the sovereign acts defense is to place the
Government as contractor on par with a private contractor in the
same circumstances,... the Government, like any other defending
party in a contract action, must show that the passage of the statute
rendering its performance impossible was an event contrary to the
basic assumptions on which the parties agreed, and must ultimately
742. I. at 2459 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f) (2) (1988) (repealed 1989)).
743. IM. (quoting United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1938)).
744. Id at 2464.
745. Id.
746. Id.
747. I& at 2464-65.
748. I& at 2467.
749. I& at 2467-68.
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show that the language or circumstances do not indicate that the
Government should be liable in any case.75
Because "it would be absurd to say that the nonoccurrence of a
change in the regulatory capital rules was a basic assumption upon
which these contracts were made,"7 1 the Court found that impossi-
bility could not be established. Additionally, the fact that the
contracts specifically allocated the risk of regulatory change to the
Government necessarily defeated an impossibility defense.75
Although the majority opinion has been summarized here only
briefly, there is no doubt that the Winstar decision has far-reaching
implications for government contractors and taxpayers alike. The
Supreme Court properly upheld the long-standing principle that the
Government, as contractor, should be liable for breach of its contracts
when it specifically abrogates the terms of those contracts acting in its
capacity as sovereign. The financial impact of this particular holding
is staggering: Winstar, Statesman, and Glendale have sought more
than $1.5 billion in damages, and eighty-eight additional cases are
pending.753 It has been projected that the Government now faces
liability somewhere in the range of $10-20 billion dollars.
754
VI. OTHER DECISIONS
In 1995, the Federal Circuit issued thirty-nine other government
contract decisions. Eighteen of these decisions were unpublished
summary affirmances of the decision below. 5 Three unpublished
750. Id. at 2469 (citation omitted).
751. Id. at 2471 (referring to Moncriefv. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 880 F. Supp.
1495, 1508 (D. Wyo. 1995); Wollmar v. CSX Transp. Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1154, 1176 (E.D. Va.
1989), affd, 898 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1990)).
752. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981)).
753. SeeJerry Knigh &Joan Biskupic, High Court RulingMay Add Billions to S&L Cleanup Cost,
WASH. PoST, July 2, 1996, at Al.
754. See id.
755. SeeJacksonvile Shipyards, Inc. v. Dalton, 73 F.3d 380 (unpublished table decision), No.
95-1272, 1995 WL 730458 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 1995); TLC Eng'g & Constr. v.Johnson, 70 F.3d
1290 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1190, 1995 WL 697310 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 1995), affg
per curiam ASBCA No. 11057, 95-1 B.GA (CCH) 1 27,456; White Buffalo Constr., Inc. v.
Glickman, 70 F.3d 128 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1122, 1995 WL 662404 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 3, 1995), af'g per curiam AGBCA Nos. 92-199-1, 93-113-1, 94-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 27,176
(1994); Holffelder Technische Dienste Ingenieurgeselschaft MBH v. West, 69 F.3d 554
(unpublished table decision), No. 94-1421, 1995 WL 616601 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 1995), affg per
curiamASBCA No. 39888,94-2 B.C.A. 1 26,809 (1994); 1RB. Enters., Inc. v. Widnall, 66 F.3d 347
(unpublished table decision), No. 95-1053, 1995 WL 550250 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 1995), afg per
curiamASBCA No. 45514,94-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,030 (1994); McDonald Welding & Mach. Co.
v. Dalton, 66 F.3d 347 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1147, 1995 WL 550251 (Fed. Cir.
Sept 14, 1995), aff'gper curiamASBCA No. 36284, 94-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 27,181 (1994); Program
& Constr. Management Group, Inc. v. West, 64 F.3d 676 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-
1084, 1995 WL 490260 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1995), affgper curiaraASBCA No. 47048, 95-1 B.C.A
(CCH) 27,413 (1995); Interstate Constr. Inc. v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table
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decisions summarily dismissed the appeal, one on settlement of the
parties,756  one on mootness grounds,757  and one on finality
grounds. 58 The remaining fifteen decisions substantively analyzed
the respective lower court decisions. Although most of these
decisions were unpublished, and although Federal Circuit Local Rules
prohibit citation to unpublished decisions as precedent,7 59 these
decisions are instructive for practitioners and academics alike and are
categorized and synopsized in this section.
A. Jurisdictional Issues
In Hardwick Bros. Co. v. United States,71 the Federal Circuit re-
versed the Court of Federal Claims and held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1500761 does not require the Court of Federal Claims to dismiss a
properly-filed claim for lack of jurisdiction when the claimant later
files an action involving the same claim in District Court.
7 2
decision), No. 94-1506, 1995 WL 424841 (Fed. Cir.July 18, 1995), affgper curiam ASBCA No.
45696, 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 26,930 (1994); Peterson Constr. Co. v. widnall, 57 F.3d 1085
(unpublished table decision), No. 94-1530, 1995 WL 358133 (Fed. Cir.June 12, 1995), aff/gper
curiam ASBCA Nos. 41132, 41142, 41600, 94-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,991 (1994); Planning &
Human Sys., Inc. v. Shaala, 56 F.3d 80 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1448, 1995 WL
298956 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 1995), aff'gper curiamASBCA No. 44013,94-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 26,860
(1994); American Contract Servs., Inc. v. Widnall, 53 F.3d 348 (unpublished table decision), No.
94-1415, 1995 WL 239306 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 1995), afg per curiam ASBCA No. 46788, 94-3
B.CA (CCH) 1 27,025 (1994); Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Dalton, 53 F.3d 347 (unpublished table
decision), No. 94-1449, 1995 WL 225545 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 1995), aff'gper curiam ASBCA Nos.
24578, 25838, 28687, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 26,687 (1994); Consultores Professionales De
Ingeniera, SA v. West, 52 F.3d 345 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1443, 1995 WL 216881
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 1995), af'g per curiam ENGBCA No. PCC-78, 94-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 26,652
(1994); Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc. v. Dalton, 50 F.3d 22 (unpublished table decision), No.
94-1408, 1995 WL 128422 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 1995), afg per cufiam ASBCA No. 43979, 94-2
B.CA. (CCH) 26,806 (1994); Vimyl Technology, Inc. v. Perry, 48 F.3d 1238 (unpublished table
decision), No. 94-1278, 1995 WL 74530 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1995), affg per curiam ASBCA Nos.
43464,45880, 93-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,693 (1993); Gulf Coast Trailing Co. v. West, 48 F.3d 1236
(unpublished table decision), No. 94-1347, 1995 WL 51610 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 1995), af gper
curiam ENGBCA No. 5795, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,921 (1994); Maitland Bros. Co. v. West, 47
F.3d 1181 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1244, 1995 WL 11193 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 11, 1995),
a F'gper curiam ENGBCA No. 5782-R, 94-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,473 (1995); Grover Enters., Inc.
v. Dalton, 47 F.3d 1180 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1336, 1995 WL 5614 (Fed. Cir.Jan
6, 1995), affgper curiam ASBCA No. 44331, 94-03 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 27,139 (1994).
756. Dyncorp v. O'Leary, 47 F.3d 1180 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1493, 1995 WL
13300 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 4, 1995).
757. Nortel Fed. Sys., Inc. v. United States Air Force, 77 F.3d 501 (unpublished table
decision), No. 95-1213, 1995 WL 723796 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 1995).
758. Renic Gov't Sys., Inc. v. Cisneros, 77 F.3d 501 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-
1238, 1995 WL 723797 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 1995).
759. FED. CiR. R. 47.6(b).
760. 72 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
761. Section 1500 provides in relevant part: "The United States Court of Federal Claims
shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has
pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1500
(1994).
762. Hardwick Bros. v. United States, 72 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Claims ruling that no
implied-in-fact contract arose between appellant and the United States
Customs Service in Lewis v. United States.71 In so affirming, the
Federal Circuit observed that the lower court's dismissal should have
been predicated on the merits rather than on jurisdictional
grounds.
7 64
B. Contract Interpretation, Contractor Claims, and Related Issues
Reversing the ASBCA in Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Goldin,71 the
Federal Circuit held that when the number of trap primers required
by the contract was latently ambiguous 766 and the contractor's
interpretation of the contract requirements was "within the zone of
reasonableness,"767 the Government could not require additional
trap primers without incurring liability for constructive change.76s
In CBI NA-CON, Inc. v. West,769 the Federal Circuit relied on a
"common sense interpretation of the contract terms... supported by
the structure of the contract" 77° and the parties' contemporaneous
conduct 771 to decipher contract requirements regarding pipe
installation. Reversing the ASBCA, the court found that the contrac-
tor had complied fully with the installation specifications.
772
In Jim Smith Contracting Co. v. West,773 the court construed the
Order of Work clause as having two independent prerequisite
conditions that required satisfaction before the contractor could
763. 70 F.3d 597 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Appellant's primary argument was that the customs
service "informer award" statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (1994), constituted an offer by the
Government to pay individuals who provide original information regarding violations of customs
laws. Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This argument was reflected as
"contrary to well-settled properties of contract law and to the statutes governing customs service
investigations." Id.
764. Id at 604. The lower court had dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction because it deemed the
claim to be "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." I& at 602. The Federal Circuit did not argue
with this characterization of the claim. Id. at 604.
765. 69 F.3d 554 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1078, 1995 WL 620154, at *4 (Fed.
Cir. Oct. 20, 1995).
766. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Goldin, 69 F.3d 554 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-
1078, 1995 WL 620154, at *1-3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 1995).
767. Id, 1995 WL 620154, at *3.
768. Id, 1995 WL 620154.
769. 52 F.3d 343 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1393, 1995 WL 133347 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
28, 1995).
770. CBI NA-CON, Inc. v. West, 52 F.3d 343 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1393, 1995
WL 133347, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 1995).
771. 1, 1995 WL 133347, at *3.
772. Id, 1995 WL 133347, at *3. The case was remanded to the Board for determination
of the contractor's entitlement to an equitable adjustment. I.




proceed to the following work item.774  Because one of the condi-
tions contained in this clause was not satisfied, the court found the
contracting officer was justified in refusing to allow the contractor to
proceed and affirmed the ENGBCA's determination that the
contractor was not entitled to any compensation pursuant to the
Suspension of Work clause.
775
Affirming the ASBCA in M. Bianchi v. Perry, 776 the court held that
a contractor was not entitled to royalties under a Value Engineering
Incentive clause because three of the contractor's Value Engineering
Change Proposals ("VECPs") were rejected by the agency in good
faith before termination of the contracts. 7 Additionally, because
the contractor's accepted VECP was not implemented on future
contracts involving "essentially the same items," the court affirmed the
ASBCA's determination that the contractor was not entitled to future
royalties.778
In Penn Environmental Controls, Inc. v. Brown,779 the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded a VABCA decision on the narrow issue of
whether the Board correctly interpreted the meaning of "extra labor
hours" contained in the contractor's labor estimates submitted in
support of a claim for an equitable adjustment.780
C. Costs
In Sippial Electric & Construction Co. v. Widnal,7 1 the court applied
its recently clarified test for Eichleay damages,7" 2 holding that the
contractor established a prima facie case for entitlement when the
Government conceded that the contractor remained on standby
774. Jim Smith Contracting Co. v. West, 61 F.3d 918 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-
1383, 1995 WL 331124, at *2 (Fed. Cir.June 2, 1995).
775. Id., 1995 WL 331124, at *3.
776. 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1166, 1995 WL 432398 (Fed. Cir.July
21, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 817 (1996).
777. M. Bianchi v. Perry, 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1166, 1995 WL
432398, at *3 (Fed. Cir. July 21, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 817 (1996). Such a finding
precluded application of the doctrine of constructive acceptance. Id., 1995 WL 432398, at *2.
778. Id., 1995 WL 432398, at *2. The court interpreted the phrase "essentially the same
items" as referring to items purchased under the contract and not component parts of those
items. Id. (citing M. Bianchi v. Perry, 31 F.3d 1163, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). The court also
determined that a final VECP never was implemented. I, 1995 WL 432398, at *2.
779. 66 F.3d 345 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1518, 1995 WL 521172 (Fed. Cir. Sept.
5, 1995).
780. Pennsylvania Envtl. Controls, Inc. v. Brown, 66 F.3d 345 (unpublished table decision),
No. 94-1518, 1995 WL 521172 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 1995). The Board's decision on remand is
located at VABCA No. 3726R, 96-1 B.CA, (CCH) 1 28,213 (1996).
781. 69 F.3d 555 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-1276, 1995 WL 646344 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
2, 1995).
782. See Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing proper application
of Eichleay formula). For a discussion of Mech-Con, see supra notes 637-56.
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during a Government-imposed delay of uncertain duration.78 The
court found that the ASBCA incorrectly placed the burden of proof
on the contractor to establish actual loss.78 The contractor, there-
fore, prevailed absent any showing by the Government that the
contractor did not suffer actual loss.
785
In GTE Government Systems Corp. v. Perry,786 the court reversed the
ASBCA and determined that a stock purchase discount afforded to
employees under a qualified company employee stock purchase plan
constituted a reimbursable cost for personal services under DAR
15.205-6. s7 Central to this holding was the determination that the
tax-deductibility of the cost, a criterion for allowability under DAR
15.205-6, was not dispositive and did not preclude recovery of the
Cost
788
D. The CDA and OtherJurisdictional Issues
In Raven Industries, Inc. v. Kelso,"9 the Federal Circuit reversed the
ASBCA's determination that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear a
claim. The court found that the Board erroneously relied on Dawco
Construction v. United States7"° and its requirement that a sum certain
be stated at the time of submission to the contracting officer.
791
Because Reflectone, Inc. v. United States792 overruled Dawco and
provides that Board jurisdiction does not depend on whether a sum
certain has been asserted to the contracting officer,793 the court
783. Sippial Elec. & Constr. v. Widnall, 69 F.3d 555 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-
1276, 1995 WL 646344, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 1995).
784. Id., 1995 WL 646344, at *3.
785. Id., 1995 WL 646344, at *4.
786. 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table decision), No. 91-1424, 1995 WL 424835 (Fed. Cr. July
18, 1995).
787. GTE Gov't Sys. Corp. v. Perry, 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table decision), No. 91-1424,
1995 WL 424835, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 1995).
788. See GTE, 61 F.3d 920, 1995 WL 424835, at *2 (holding that when employer elected to
qualify stock plan and forgo tax deduction in effort to provide employees with favorable tax
treatment, DAR 15.205-6 did not bar recoverability of discount).
789. 62 F.3d 1433 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-1374,1995 WL 453069 (Fed. Cir.July
31, 1995).
790. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled byReflectone, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
791. Raven Indus., Inc. v. Kelso, 62 F.3d 1433 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-1374,
1995 WL 453069, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 1995).
792. 60 F.3d. 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
793. Raven Indus., 62 F.3d 1483, 1995 WL 453069, at *1. The Board has CDAjurisdiction
so long as a sum certain is stated by the date of appeal. Id., 1995 WL 453069, at *1. For a
discussion of Rejleaone and what constitutes a claim under the CDA, see discussion supra notes
52-27.
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remanded the case for reinstatement and consideration on the
merits.
794
An order by HUD regarding enforceability of a federally guaranteed
home owners' loan could not be reviewed by the Federal Circuit in
Reece v. Cisneros.7 5 Because the loan involved was not a contract for
the direct procurement of property or services by the United
States, 96 the Board's order was not a final decision for the purposes
of the CDA and the court was without jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.
797
In International Gunnery Range Services, Inc. v. Widnall 798 the
Federal Circuit vacated an ASBCA decision that rescinded a contract
modification authorized by the Air Force Contract Adjustment Board
("AFCAB") .7' Because decisions of contract adjustment boards are
final and not subject to review, the Federal Circuit found that the
Board was without authority to rescind the AFCAB modification."°
In Henke v. United States,"' the Federal Circuit concluded that the
six-year statute of limitations for filing claims in the Court of Federal
Claims °2 did not bar suit for payment by a pilot who allegedly flew
marijuana from Colombia to Mexico pursuant to a covert contract
with the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA). °8 The court noted
that claim accrual typically occurs "'when all events necessary to fix
the Government's liability have occurred.'" 8  Reasoning that the
purpose of the contract was not the mere transportation of drugs, but
rather obtaining information about Colombian and Mexican
794. Id., 1995 WL 453069, at *1.
795. 60 F.3d 841 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1140,1995 WL 376184 (Fed. Cir.June
8, 1995).
796. Reece v. Cisneros, 60 F.3d 841 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1140, 1995 WL
376184, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 8, 1995) (citing Institute Pasteur v. United States, 814 F.2d 624,
627-28 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
797. Id, 1995 WL 376184, at *1.
798. 64 F.3d 678 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1444, 1995 WL 502895 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
24, 1995)).
799. International Gunnery Range Servs., Inc. v. Widnall, 64 F.3d 678 (unpublished table
decision), No. 94-1444, 1995 WL 502895, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 1995). The case was
remanded to the Board. SeeASBCA No. 34152, 1996 WL 466645 (Aug. 12, 1996).
800. Id, 1995 WL 502895, at *5 (citing Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 873
F.2d 1410, 1413 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Coastal Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 728,731 (Fed. Cir.
1983)); see Pub. L. No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1435
(1994)) (providing that agency may establish contract adjustment board whose decisions in
approving, authorizing, and directing appropriate contract action are not subject to appeal); 48
C.F.R. § 50.201 (1995) (authorizing creation of contract adjustment boards).
801. 60 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
802. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994).
803. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797-98 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The court declined to
entertain government arguments raising issues of sovereign immunity. Id. at 799.
804. Id. (quoting L.S.S. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 695 F.2d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
1982)).
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involvement in drug trafficking into the United States, the court
determined that the date for claim accrual was sometime following
the actual transport.0 5 Consequently, the fact that the pilot filed
suit six years and one day from the date of transport did not make his
claim for payment untimely."0 6
E. Bid Protests
In Network Solutions, Inc. v. Widna[,8 7 the Federal Circuit applied
the reasoning set forth in PRC, Inc. v. Widnall °8 to hold that the
lower court's order vacating the GSBCA's decision sustaining a
contractor's protest did not require the Board to dismiss the contract-
or's motion for costs.
8 °9
F Contracting Officer's Abuse of Discretion?
Reversing the ASBCA in Mallory Electric Co. v. Dalton,81 0 the court
held that the contractor sufficiently established reliance on the
agency's prior practice of paying progress payments due to the
contractor in full when it bid on the contract." Consequently, the
contracting officer abused his discretion when he withheld a
percentage of the progress payments due to the contractor under an
informal agency rule. 12
805. Id. at 799-800.
806. Id. at 800-01. The court found it unnecessary to address the argument raised by Henke
that even if the claim accrued on the date of transport, the statute of limitations would not bar
his claim. Id. at 799. It ruled that because Henke had filed suit erroneously for more than
$10,000 in district court, the District Court properly had dismissed his claim for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. Henke argued that such filing equitably tolled the statute of limitations. Id.
807. 70 F.3d 1289 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1480, 1995 WL 656809 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 23, 1995), revg GSBCA Nos. 11498-P, 11863-C, 94-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 27,160 (1994).
808. 64 F.3d 644 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see supra notes 389-411 and accompanying text for a
detailed discussion of this case.
809. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Widnall, 70 F.3d 1289 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-
1480, 1995 WL 656809, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 1995). The case was remanded to the Board
and the Board's decision is at GSBCA No. 11863-C-REM, 96-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 23,148 (1996).
810. 60 F.3d 839 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1432, 1995 WL 375947 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
5, 1995).
811. Mailory Elec. Co. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 839 (unpublished table decision), No. 94-1432,1995
WL 375947, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 1995).
812. Id., 1995 WL 375947, at *2 (citing C. Lawrence Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 45270, 93-3
B.CA (CCH) I 26,129 (1986)). The court in Mallory paraphrased the holding in Lawrence,
stating-
[When] a bidding contractor assumes, based on its own past experience, that full
progress payments will be made for materials stored at a construction site, it is an
abuse of discretion for a contracting officer to withhold such payments on the ground
that the contractor has not yet paid its supplier.
IM, 1995 WL 375947, at *2.
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In Minelli v. United States81 the court ruled that a contracting
officer had no obligation to grant the contractor a waiver of the
contract's painting surface temperature restriction and did not abuse
his discretion in terminating the contract for default 814 The court
concluded that: (1) a termination for default is appropriate when it
is clear that there is no reasonable likelihood that the contractor can
complete performance in the time prescribed; 15 (2) when the
contractor admitted that it could not perform in a timely manner
absent a waiver, default termination was proper;816 and (3) although
the factors enumerated in FAR 49.402-3(f)81 7 should inform a
contracting officer's decision regarding default termination, failure to
consider all factors does not necessarily indicate an abuse of discre-
tion.818
G. Amount of Interest Due
In Dalton v. Murdock Machine & Engineering Co.,819 the court
affirmed the ASBCA's determination that the Government was
entitled to principal and interest on V-Loans held by the Navy
8 21
and could offset the amounts owed to it from the amounts owed to
the contractor following termination for convenience.8 2' Disagree-
ing with the formula adopted by the Board for the calculation of the
813. 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-5018, 1995 WL 424858 (Fed. Cir.July
18, 1995).
814. Minelli v. United States, 61 F.3d 920 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-5018, 1995
WL 424858, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 1995).
815. Id., 1995 WL 424858, at *2.
816. Id., 1995 WL 424858, at *3.
817. 48 C.F.R. § 49.402-3(f) (1995).
818. Minelli; 61 F.3d 920, 1995 WL 424858, at *4. The regulation sets forth the following
factors that contracting officers should consider when determining whether to terminate a
contract for default:
(1) The terms of the contract and applicable laws and regulations.
(2) The specific failure of the contractor and the excuses for the failure.
(3) The availability of the supplies or services from other sources.
(4) The urgency of the need for the supplies or services and the period of time
required to obtain them from other sources, as compared with the time delivery could
be obtained from the delinquent contractor.
(5) The degree of essentiality of the contractor in the Government acquisition program
and the effect of a termination default upon the contractor's capability as a supplier
under other contracts.
(6) The effect of a termination for default on the ability of the contractor to liquidate
guaranteed loans, progress payments, or advanced payments.
(7) Any other pertinent facts and circumstances.
1&, 1995 WL 424858, at *4 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 49.402-3(f)).
819. 66 F.3d 344 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-1121,1995 WL 515222 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
30, 1995).
820. Dalton v. Murdoch Mach. & Eng'g Co., 66 F.3d 344 (unpublished table decision), No.
95-1121, 1995 WL 515222, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1995).
82i. I., 1995 WL 515222, at *2.
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amount of interest recoverable by the Navy, the Court set forth the
proper formula to be applied by the Board on remand.
822
H. Beacon Oil Co. v. O'Leary
Finally, in a case that the Federal Circuit charitably characterized
as "dishearteningly protracted," Beacon Oil Co. v. O'Leary,23 the court
issued an opinion that is mind-numbing in its historical detail and dry
legal complexity. The court reversed the latest DOEBCA ruling in a
fifteen-year-old dispute about the price paid to the Government for
a 1979 purchase of crude oil under the Naval Petroleum Reserves
Production Act of 1976.824 The court remanded the case to the
DOE Board for trial on the issues of "purchaser" and "posted
price."82
CONCLUSION
In 1995, the Federal Circuit issued a number of government
contract decisions that were decidedly helpful in furthering the cause
of procurement simplification, a cause also championed by Congress
during the same year. 26 Most of the 1995 decisions seem logical
and well-supported; nevertheless, one continues to be struck by the
amount of time consumed by largely procedural disputes that do not
seem to merit Federal Circuit review. Although it certainly is true that
any court has its share of cases that reasonable people would agree
take an inordinate amount of resources to resolve, the procurement
system of the U.S. Government seems especially prone to litigation
that could best be resolved in other ways, or that should not arise at
all. Endless litigation on when a claim is a claim, involving the
centerpiece of the eighteen-year-old CDA, should not have occurred.
Twenty-four years ago, the Commission on Government Procure-
ment issued its Report,"m the result of an exhaustive two year study
of the procurement system, in which it concluded that the then
existing government procurement dispute resolution system was
inadequate, and that improvements in the system were necessary.
The CDA incorporated several of the Commission's suggestions six
years later. The CDA was designed specifically to "induce resolution
822. Mdt, 1995 WL 515222, at *1-2.
823. 71 F.3d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
824. 10 U.S.C. §§ 7420-7438 (1994).
825. Beacon Oil Co. v. O'Leary, 71 F.3d 391, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
826. See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243
(codified in relevant part in scattered sections of 41 U.S.C.) (simplifying federal procurement
processes).
827. See COMMISSION ON GOV'T PROCUREMENT, supra note 29.
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of more contract disputes by negotiation prior to litigation; equalize
the bargaining power of the parties when a dispute exists; provide
alternate forums suitable to handle the different types of disputes;
and insure fair and equitable treatment to contractors and Govern-
ment agencies. " "
Unfortunately, as illustrated by the 1995 Federal Circuit cases, we
have not yet achieved these goals. The procurement system, and the
system for resolving disputes under it, is too cumbersome and
expensive, and often is unfair.29
The cases before the Federal Circuit in 1995 illustrate that much
remains to lie done to reform the system and that reform must be
undertaken by both the courts and Congress.
Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton8" was a welcome clarification of what
constitutes a CDA claim, but the relief engendered by its appearance
is tempered by the knowledge that the system that produced the
murky language of FAR 33.201 and Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United
States831 is still alive and well. Further, it seems certain that, lacking
congressional intervention through new legislation, we will see a series
of new cases in the coming years that will argue the details of the
Reflectone ruling, such as the definition of "routine" and "non-routine"
submissions. 32 Termination for convenience claims will be among
the first to be applied to Reflectone. Bill Strong Enterprises, Inc. v.
Shannon833 shows that the availability of costs under CDA claims also
must be examined in light of Reflectone.8"
Cases such as Gould, Inc. v. United State 35 and Beacon Oil Company
v. O'Lear136 seem doomed to sail interminably across the procure-
ment seascape without a means of reasonably quick resolution. It also
seems likely that the issues ofjurisdiction raised in Quality Tooling, Inc.
v. United States37 will rise again, quite possibly in Congress or as a
828. 41 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
829. See Eldon H. Crowell & Charles Pou, Jr., Appealing Government Contract Decisions:
Reducing the Cost and Delay of Procurement Litigation with Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques,
49 MD. L. REV. 183, 183 (1990) (suggesting that current appeal system for government contract
cases is expensive, complicated, time-consuming, and frustrating).
830. 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
831. 48 C.FR. § 33.201 (1995); 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
832. Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572,1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing "routine" and
"non-routine" claims for payment).
833. 49 F.d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
834. Bill Strong Enters., Inc. v. Shannon, 49 F.d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
835. 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
836. 71 F.3d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
837. 47 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rehk in banc denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16623 (Fed.
Cir.June 16, 1995).
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result of a new series of conflicting CDA decisions from the district
courts.
Congress and the Clinton administration are attempting to improve
the system. In January 1996, Congress passed and the President
signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996,11 the latest attempt at procurement reform. Among other
things, the Act removes the bid protest jurisdiction of the GSBCA, 89
eliminating a rich source of appeals (and reversals) for the Federal
Circuit. Despite such progress, the only meaningful way to improve
the procurement dispute resolution system in a manner that meets
the goals of the Commission on Government Procurement is to create
an underlying procurement system that is much simpler than any thus
far proposed. The ideal system would look more like the commercial
system in that it would not hinder government and contractor
procurement officials with the sort of convoluted regulations and
procedures that have characterized the procurement system since at
least World War II. Until such monumental change occurs, the
Federal Circuit and other fora will continue to hear too many cases
that often seem to have more to do with tossing wrenches into the
overly complicated and delicate machinery of the procurement
process than the resolution of substantive issues.
838. Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 22, 38,
40, and 41 U.S.C.).
839. See, eg., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 4203, 110 Stat. 186, 654-655 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 431).
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